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The purpose of this project is to identify the costs and benefits associated with the 
application of closed-cell spray foam insulation to forward-deployed, 
semipermanent/nonpermanent structures, and to provide recommendations regarding 
future integration, use, and employment. According to the Department of Defense 
(DOD), forward-deployed generators, used to provide power to base support activities, 
are the largest single consumer of fuel throughout the battlefield. Eighty percent of the 
energy provided by generators is assessed to power environmental control units that run 
incessantly due to the poor insulating properties of the structures, according to a 2010 
study conducted by the Department of the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency. 
Recent DOD policy has focused more on energy use and consumption but fails to 
address, and provide solutions for, major consumers of fuel throughout the battlefield. 
The incorporation of closed-cell, spray foam insulation into legacy DOD forward-
deployed construction practices yields a significant return on investment, short-
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  1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest consumer of energy in the 
United States and accounts for approximately 90% of the petroleum-based products used 
by the U.S. government (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2008a). In fiscal 
year (FY) 2013, the DOD consumed approximately 89.9 million barrels of fuel, at the 
cost of $14.8 billion, to sustain military operations worldwide. In FY 2014, DOD 
projected consumption levels to increase to approximately 104.6 million barrels of fuel, 
costing $16 billion—a 16.4% increase in quantity consumed and an 8% increase in cost 
from FY 2013 levels (Department of Defense [DOD], 2014). Although operational 
energy fuel costs compose only 3% of the proposed $529.9 billion DOD FY 2014 Base 
Budget request, energy demands remain a significant factor to military readiness, force 
planning, and capability. Global energy price volatility and increases in operational 
energy costs complicate the budget processes, resulting in additional appropriations and 
trade-offs required to cover funding shortfalls. In 2007, near oil’s peak price per barrel, 
the DOD estimated that for “every $10 increase in price per barrel, operating costs 
increase by approximately $1.7 billion” (GAO, 2008a, p. 4). 
In 2011, the DOD consumed nearly 5 billion gallons of fuel, costing 
approximately $17.3 billion, to support global U.S. strategic interests and military 
operations (GAO, 2012). In Afghanistan alone, DOD officials stated, “more than 43 
million gallons of fuel (781,818 barrels), on average, were supplied each month” (GAO, 
2012, p. 6) to support ongoing combat operations (see Figure 1). According to the 
Defense Science Board Task Force (DSBTF), a team established to identify opportunities 
arising from new technology, fuel logistics represent “approximately 70% of U.S. Army 
tonnage” (DOD, 2008, p. 23) transported throughout the battlefield. Large fuel 
requirements create significant risks to personnel, property, and mission during the 
transportation and delivery phases of fuel to forward-deployed locations. As such, 
increased fuel efficiency results in less risk and increased operational endurance time, 
which equates to more efficient and effective use of combat power. 
  2 
 
Figure 1.  Three-mile backup of fuel delivery trucks and other supply vehicles inside 
Afghanistan along the Northern Passage from Pakistan (from GAO, 2008a). 
1. DOD Action to Address Forward-Deployed Fuel Consumption 
In 2006, United States Marine Corps Major General Richard Zilmer, Commander 
of Multinational Forces-West (MNF-W) in Iraq’s Al-Anbar Province, recognized fuel 
demand as an emerging threat to combat operations in his area of responsibility. He 
submitted a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) requesting a “renewable 
and self-sustainable energy solution to support forward operating bases, combat outposts 
and observation posts throughout MNF-W’s battlespace” (Eady, Siegel, Bell, & Dicke, 
2009, p. 1). The request went on to say that “by reducing the need for [petroleum-based 
fuels] at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the 
road, thereby reducing the danger to our marines, soldiers, and sailors” (p. 1). 
As seen in Al-Anbar Province, Iraq, high demand for fuel results in a significant 
burden on U.S. forces tasked with the transportation and protection of fuel convoys. 
According to the DOD, “44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or 
other events” (GAO, 2009, p. 8) in June 2008 in Afghanistan. At the 2008 Defense 
Energy Support Center (DESC), standard price of $2.83 per gallon for Jet Propulsion 
Fuel, Type 8 (JP-8), a fuel commonly used for tactical vehicles and generators, the loss 
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equates to $622,600 in fuel costs; not including costs associated with vehicle 
damage/loss, loss of life, and reduction of combat readiness and capability. 
In response to Major General Zilmer’s JUONS, the U.S. Army, through the Army 
Rapid Equipping Force (REF), created the Power Surety Task Force (PSTF) to explore 
material and nonmaterial solutions to the problem. The PSTF is charged with supporting 
and developing programs and/or initiatives that provide solutions to urgent needs requests 
that are deployable within 18 months (GAO, 2008a). The resulting efforts culminated in 
the analysis of two technologies—foam insulated tents and biodegradable dome 
structures—intended to reduce the number of generators and decrease fuel consumption 
for power generation at forward-deployed locations (GAO, 2008a). 
2. Introduction of Spray Foam Insulation to Forward-Deployed 
Structures 
In 2007, the Army began applying closed-cell spray foam (CCSF) insulation to 
nonexpeditionary structures to increase heating and cooling efficiencies, and to decrease 
associated electrical and fuel demands. Since the project’s inception, $130 million in 
external insulation of temporary structures (EITS) contracts were awarded to apply foam 
to approximately 13.5 million square feet of nonexpeditionary structures in Iraq 
(Foulkner & Wilke, 2010) (see Figure 2). As of July 2009, 4 million square feet of CCSF 
insulation was applied to approximately 1,200 structures within United States Central 
Command (CENTCOM) AOR (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
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Figure 2.  General-purpose-medium (GP-M) tent before, during, and after closed-cell 
foam insulation application (from Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
In 2009, the Department of the Army’s Director of Operations and Logistics 
Readiness tasked the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) with 
conducting an analysis of energy and cost savings related to CCSF insulation application 
to nonexpeditionary structures in Iraq. The AMSAA conducted an engineering and cost 
analysis, based on “heat-transfer principles,” to determine the annual cost savings related 
to fuel reduction from increased heating and cooling efficiencies gained from the foam 
application. Five types of structures, commonly used throughout forward operating bases 
(FOBs) in Iraq, were studied at four Iraq locations utilized by the United States and 
coalition forces. The structures analyzed were the Southwest Asia Hut, frame tent, 
general-purpose-medium (GP-M) tent, general-purpose-large (GP-L) tent, and barrel 
structures. The analysis calculated fuel savings from a sample of 794 structures that were 
applied with CCSF insulation. Fuel savings were translated to dollars saved, payback 
period, and fuel convoy reduction (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
Results analysis determined that the application of CCSF insulation to tent 
structures in Iraq yielded “approximately 50%” in fuel savings and calculated the 
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“average payback period as less than 75 days using the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
(FBCF) price of $13.80 per gallon” (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010, p. 1). The AMSAA further 
extrapolated the individual structure savings and applied it to FOB-level infrastructures, 
based on the awarded EITS contracts, yielding an estimated fuel savings of 4.7 million 
gallons, or $65 million annually (2009 budget year [BY] dollars). AMSAA translated the 
4.6 million gallons saved into 5,000 gallon fuel trucks, commonly used by U.S. military 
forces to transport fuel in forward-deployed locations, resulting in approximately 940 fuel 
tanker trips avoided. 
While the AMSAA study captures the initial cost savings from CCSF insulation, 
it does not account for other relevant costs and benefits associated with its application 
due to the time constraints under which the AMSAA study was conducted. Other costs 
and benefits applicable to CCSF insulation use include reduction in generator size 
requirements, loss of life, loss of equipment due to transportation, disposal costs, health 
and/or safety concerns, structure life-cycle costs, and structure replacement costs. True 
cost savings related to the application of CCSF insulation, when factoring in the above 
benefits, yield a significantly shorter payback period and greater value in cost savings 
over the anticipated life of the structures. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Master of Business Administration (MBA) project is to 
conduct a cost benefit analysis (CBA) on the application of CCSF insulation to 
nonexpeditionary structures commonly used at forward-deployed locations and provide 
recommendations regarding future integration, use, and employment. Emphasis will be 
placed on the relevant, quantifiable, and non-quantifiable costs and benefits associated 
with the insulation’s use. This project will provide relevant cost formulas associated with 
three types of structures (i.e., a frame tent, a GP-M tent, and a GP-L tent) dependent on 
other associated variables that will yield total cost savings associated with CCSF 
insulation’s integration into each respective structure’s construction. Additionally, this 
project will provide recommendations on possible procurement and acquisition strategies 
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(e.g., in-time contract and program of record) and other areas of applicable use or 
methods of employment. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The following methodology was implemented for this research: 
• Review DOD operational energy policies, regulations, and strategies. 
• Review DOD operational energy use. 
• Review current DOD forward-deployed construction practices. 
• Review current DOD forward-deployed structure characteristics. 
• Review available data associated with forward-deployed structure energy 
consumption use. 
• Review CCSF insulation use regulations and directives. 
• Conduct a CBA on CCSF insulation application and use. 
• Provide recommendations on future and alternative uses of CCSF insulation to 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Department of Defense and Office of 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). 
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II. DOD OPERATIONAL ENERGY FRAMEWORK 
A. DEFINING DOD OPERATIONAL ENERGY 
Operational energy, defined by U.S. Code 10, Section 138c, as “energy required 
for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military 
operations” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs 
[ASD OEPP], 2015, p. 1), is a major cost driver of global U.S. military operations and a 
component of the DOD’s annual operating budget estimates. Operational energy 
encompasses a broad spectrum of fuel sources and types to include nuclear, wind, solar, 
geothermal, coal, natural gas, and petroleum-based products. The inefficient use of 
operational energy can have a significant impact on the conduct of worldwide military 
operations by increasing the costs in a fiscally restricted environment. Additionally, 
mismanagement of operational energy creates a logistics burden while conducting 
military operations in forward-deployed locations. 
Petroleum-based products, the major component of operational energy, are not 
solely used to power combat weapons systems. Petroleum-based energy sources, 
however, are required in significant amounts to power base support activities in forward-
deployed locations that rely on spot generation in the absence of established power grids 
or energy infrastructures. Forward-deployed locations, consisting of contingency 
operating bases (COBs) or FOBs, are commonly comprised of numerous temporary 
and/or semipermanent structures that satisfy support infrastructure requirements such as 
berthing, offices, sewer, water, and messing. Fuel requirements for base support activities 
are those associated with base vehicle use and generators providing power for 
communication, information technology systems, air conditioning, heating, lighting, and 
other infrastructure equipment. According to the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), base support activities’ fuel consumption, as a percentage of total fuel 
consumption, can range from 13% at large, forward-deployed air bases such as Bagram 
Air Field, Afghanistan, to 78% and 73% in locations such as Camp Arifjan, Kuwait and 
COB Adder, Iraq, respectively (GAO, 2009) (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Proportion of fuel consumption reported for base support activities and for 
air and ground operations by selected, forward-deployed locations for June 2008 
(from GAO, 2009). 
In 2001, the Defense Science Board (DSB) found that “of the top ten battlefield 
fuel users, only two were combat systems; the rest were support systems” (DOD, 2008,  
p. 29). The DSB also found that fuel demand generated by a water heater for messing use 
was greater than that of an AH-46D attack helicopter. 
In 2008, the DSB conducted an analysis on-base support activity fuel use. The 
study concluded that the fuel consumption levels and proportions were relatively 
unchanged since 2001. Of the base support activities in forward-deployed locations, energy 
production by generators was the largest battlefield consumer of fuel and consumed more 
than combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and tactical vehicles (see Table 1) (DOD, 2008). The 
United States Air Force calculated that up to 65% of fuel convoys at certain forward-
deployed locations were transporting fuel for generators and that 80% of power generated 
at these locations was to power environmental control units (ECU) for FOB structures 
(Department of the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency [AFCESA], 2010). 
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Table 1.   Army fuel consumption in peacetime and wartime (million gallons 
per year) (from DOD, 2008). 
B. OVERVIEW OF PAST DOD OPERATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 
1. Past DOD Operational Energy Studies and Findings 
The DOD has made significant efforts to better understand operational energy 
issues by initiating and sponsoring studies conducted by organizations within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In addition to the numerous GAO and Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) studies and reports summarizing DOD actions needed to reduce 
fuel demand, the below studies have served as catalysts for continuing action and reform 
with regard to policy and organizational changes within the DOD and the respective 
service branches. 
In 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
(USD [AT&L]) tasked the DSB to conduct a study on actions needed to improve the fuel 
efficiency of weapons platforms. The study’s major conclusions were:  
• Although significant warfighting, logistics and cost benefits occur when 
weapons systems are made more fuel-efficient, these benefits are not valued 
or emphasized in the DOD requirements and acquisition process.  
• The DOD resource allocation and accounting processes (Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), DOD Comptroller) do not 
reward fuel efficiency or penalize inefficiency.  
• Operational and logistics wargaming of fuel requirements is not cross-linked 
to the Service requirements development or acquisition program processes.  
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• High payoff, fuel efficient technologies are available now to improve 
warfighting effectiveness in current weapon systems through the retrofit and 
in new systems acquisition. (Truly & Alm, 2001, p. ES3-ES5) 
In 2006, the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering enlisted 
the resources of The JASONs, an independent defense advisory group, to “assess ways to 
reduce DOD’s dependence on fossil fuels” (GAO, 2008a, p. 8). The group examined 
technological options to reduce dependence on fossil fuels or increase efficiency of 
current and future weapon systems able to meet military capability performance 
requirements. Additionally, the study highlighted overall consequences related to fossil 
fuel dependence and provided recommendations and areas of focus for DOD 
improvement. Major conclusions were:  
• Fuel use is characterized by large multipliers and co-factors: at the simplest 
level, it takes fuel to deliver fuel.   
• Fuel use imposes large logistical burdens, operational constraints and 
liabilities, and vulnerabilities: otherwise capable offensive forces can be 
countered by attacking more-vulnerable logistical-supply chains.  
• Because of the long life cycle of DOD systems, uncertainties about an 
unpredictable future make it advisable to decrease DOD fuel use to minimize 
exposure and vulnerability to potential unforeseen disruptions in world and 
domestic supply  (Dimotakis, Lewis, & Grober, 2006, p. iv) 
In May 2006, at the same time that The JASONs’ study was underway, the USD 
(AT&L) directed the DSB to examine the DOD’s energy strategy, focusing efforts 
towards finding areas in which to reduce energy demands, identify “institutional 
obstacles” to their implementation, and assess “potential commercial and security 
benefits to the nation” (DOD, 2008, p. 3). The final report was released in February 2008 
and cited the following findings:  
• The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force 
Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have not 
been implemented, with one being for the DOD to re-engineer its business 
processes to make energy a factor in the key Departmental decisions that 
establish requirements, shape acquisition programs and set funding priorities.  
• The Department lacks the strategy, policies, metrics, information, and 
governance structure necessary to properly manage its energy risks. (p. 4) 
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• There are technologies available now to make DOD systems more energy 
efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their implementation and resulting 
in inadequate future S&T investments.  
• Operational risks from fuel disruption require demand-side remedies; mission 
risks from electricity disruption to installations require both demand- and 
supply-side remedies.  (DOD, 2008, pp. 3–5)  
In 2007, the Logistics Management Institute, a private, not-for-profit corporation 
that provides management consulting, research, and analysis to government 
organizations, was contracted by the OSD, Office of Force Transformation and 
Resources to assist in establishing a DOD framework for a comprehensive energy 
strategy. The Logistics Management Institute identified “disconnects” where the DOD 
has the opportunity to change its views that would enable achieving the strategic goals of 
a comprehensive energy strategy. These disconnects are listed below: 
• Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support 
requirements) in the department’s key corporate processes: strategic planning, 
analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development, acquisition, 
and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE).  
• Establish a corporate governance structure with policy and resource over- 
sight to focus the department’s energy efforts.  
• Apply a structured framework to address energy efficiency, including al- 
ternate energy sources, to the department’s greatest energy challenges— those 
areas consuming the most fuel, requiring the most logistics support, or having 
the most negative impact on the warrior. (Crowley et al., 2007, p. iv) 
As the above studies highlight, there are major obstacles to the DOD’s 
management of operational energy. Common themes include the lack of organizational 
hierarchies at the department and service level; the lack of directive policy with regard to 
reporting, management, conservation, efficiency; and lack of value and/or consideration 
operational energy has within the requirements and acquisition management systems. 
2. Past DOD Operational Energy Policy Implementations 
Since the release of the above studies, the DOD has taken steps to improve upon 
its management positions, policies, directives, and the value that it places on operational 
energy. In 2006, the OSD created the DOD Energy Security Task Force to address and 
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oversee energy security concerns (GAO, 2008a). This task force also monitors the 
progress of various service-level research and development (R&D) projects that can 
potentially decrease operational energy demands. It operates as an integrated project team 
(IPT), consisting of members of the military service branches, defense agencies, Office of 
the USD (AT&L), Office of the USD for Policy, OSD’s Program Analysis and 
Evaluation Office, and the DOD Comptroller’s Office. Working groups are used to 
disseminate information and deliberate on ideas and efforts to reduce fuel demands of 
current and future weapons systems. 
In 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Mr. Gordon England, 
added energy to the DOD’s list of the “top 25 transformational priorities” for the 
department “as part of its initiative to pursue targeted acquisition reforms”(GAO, 2008a, 
p. 2). Also in 2007, the Honorable John J. Young, Jr., the USD (AT&L), directed that the 
fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) be included in the acquisition strategies of all tactical 
systems that have energy demands associated with their operation (GAO, 2008b). Using 
the FBCF allows the DOD to capture the true fuel cost of a weapon system over its 
anticipated life cycle and better captures the impact of fuel prices on DOD operations. 
In 2009, the DOD increased focus on operational energy issues and established 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs 
(ASD [OEP&P]). In addition to overseeing department-wide efforts, the ASD (OEP&P) 
Current Operations Division is focused on supporting combatant commanders in the 
areas of rapid fielding of energy initiatives, technology, and contingency basing (Office 
of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], Historical Office, 2014). 
Following the establishment of the ASD (OEP&P), U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 
(USF-A) created an Operational Energy Division to oversee and manage U.S. Central 
Command’s fuel consumption and alternative fuel initiatives. Due to large fuel 
consumption levels caused by generators, the USF-A Operational Energy Division 
initiated efforts to transition from generators to centralized power grids by securing $108 
million (2011FY$) in investment funding for power-efficient generation, distribution, and 
infrastructure improvements (GAO, 2012). The DOD estimated that the investment 
would remove approximately “545 generators,” yielding an annual savings of 
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approximately 17.5 million gallons of fuel, or the removal of “7,000 fuel trucks from the 
roads in Afghanistan” (GAO, 2012, p. 12). Furthermore, USD (AT&L) issued a 
memorandum to reprogram overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds “to expedite 
the deployment of more efficient generators, centralized power projects, and shelter 
modification kits to forward- deployed locations in Afghanistan” (GAO, 2012, p. 12). 
In FY2009, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 
110–417, “introduced the concept of energy as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP)” 
(Bohnwagner 2013a, p. 1) to ensure energy demand of weapons systems are optimized to 
manage the expected fuel burden throughout the program’s life cycle. A KPP is “a 
characteristic or attribute of a system that is considered critical or essential to the 
development of an effective military capability” (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 
2015, p. 1). Codifying the requirement, The National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 
mandated adding the energy KPP to the requirements development process, updating the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and classifying energy 
as a required KPP. This KPP requires “fuel efficiency and logistic resupply risk 
considerations” (Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2009, p. B-6) are analyzed 
as part of the design process to mitigate fuel requirements associated with employment of 
the weapon system. 
On June 14, 2011, the DOD released its Operational Energy Strategy, thus setting 
the direction and framework for DOD operational energy efforts within OSD, Office of 
the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, (CJCS), combatant commands, 
and military departments and agencies. The strategy outlines three ways, focused on the 
warfighter, to ensure that the armed forces have the energy resources required to meet 
current and future threats and challenges. Strategic goals and priorities were established 
within each of the three principles, listed below, thereby defining the objectives of the 
operational energy efforts. 
• More fight, less fuel: Reduce the demand for energy in military operations.  
• More options, less risk: Expand and secure the supply of energy to military 
operations.  
  14 
• More capability, less cost: Build energy security into the future force.  
(DOD, 2011, p. 1)  
To put the strategy into action, ASD (OEP&P) released the Operational Energy 
Strategy: Implementation Plan in 2012, which established targets to achieve the strategic 
goals of overall reduced consumption, increased energy efficiencies to enhance 
effectiveness, and reduced cost and mission risk. The targets directed the measurement of 
current DOD operational energy use to better identify and understand areas of 
improvement by establishing standardized performance metrics. Additionally, the targets 
assessed and analyzed fuel use for conducting combat operations and training, as well as 
departmental efforts to improve efficiencies. Other targets include a focus on operational 
energy innovation, energy security, the viability and development of alternative fuels, and 
the inclusion of energy security considerations in the acquisition process. The 
Operational Energy Strategy Implementation Plan targets are: 
• Target 1: Measure Operational Energy Consumption.  
• Target 2: Improve Energy Performance and Efficiency in Operations and 
Training.  
• Target 3: Promote Operational Energy Innovation.  
• Target 4: Improve Operational Energy Security at Fixed Installations.  
 
• Target 5: Promote the Development of Alternative Fuels.  
• Target 6: Incorporate Energy Security Considerations into Requirements and 
Acquisition.  
• Target 7: Adapt Policy, Doctrine, Professional Military Education, and 
Combatant Command Activities. (DOD, 2012a, p. 3-7) 
Along with the above targets, the implementation plan set milestones, reporting 
requirements, and assigned responsibilities and accountability for achieving the strategic 
initiatives. According to the ASD (OEP&P) FY2012 budget report, the military services 
anticipate spending approximately $4 billion in operational energy initiatives through 
FY2017 to improve overall energy management and decrease operational consumption 
(GAO, 2012). Figure 4 summarizes the ASD (OEP&P)’s key operational energy 
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milestones since the office’s inception, as a result of the numerous studies  
mentioned above. 
 
Figure 4.  Timeline of key events in OEP&P efforts to manage operational energy 
issues (from GAO, 2012). 
C. DOD OPERATIONAL ENERGY PRICING FOR FUEL 
1. Standard Price 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), through the DESC within the DLA-E 
office, is responsible for the purchase, storage, distribution, and sale of energy to various 
military buyers worldwide. The DESC buys petroleum-based products from global 
suppliers, financed through a defense working capital fund, and sells it to DOD 
customers to fulfill their energy requirements. To reduce transportation costs, fuel is 
purchased from suppliers in close proximity to their customers. DLA-E maintains, stores, 
and distributes fuel from over 600 fuel depots located in strategic locations worldwide 
(Schwartz, Blakeley, & O’Rourke, 2012). 
Due to transportation-associated costs, the DLA-E purchase price of fuel varies. 
To account for this variation, DLA-E established a global-level set price, or standard 
price, for each specific fuel type that is for sale to its DOD customers. Standard prices are 
usually set and published every 18 months or shorter, depending on market volatility, to 
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provide predictability for DOD budgetary or operational planning purposes. To set the 
standard price, DLA-E averages the cost of fuel purchased and adds a surcharge to 
account for their operating costs associated with the fuel’s storage and transportation. 
Once set, the standard price for each respective fuel type is the price paid by their 
customers, regardless of the customer’s location (Schwartz et al., 2012). 
2. Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
As defined under Section 332 of the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, 
the fully burdened cost of fuel is “the commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all 
personnel and assets required to move, and when necessary, protect the fuel from the 
point at which the fuel is received from the commercial supplier to the point of use” 
(Bohnwagner, 2013b, p. 1). 
Because the DOD purchases and sells fuel based on a “wholesale” or averaged 
price, the DESC standard price does not include nor account for the delivery costs from 
the point of distribution/sale to the end user. Not accounting for such costs diminishes the 
accuracy of the true cost of fuel. 
FBCF, referred to as the fully burdened cost of energy (FBCE) when applied to 
all fuel sources, is calculated by the summation of a number of elements accounting for 
costs incurred from the point of distribution or sale. As seen in Table 2, determining the 
FBCF is highly dependent on tangible and intangible costs. Tangible costs include miles 
traveled, transportation assets required, and protection. Intangible costs include those 
associated with environmental and regulatory compliance. Because of these varying 
elements, there is no standardized FBCF estimating methodology applicable to  
all situations. 
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Table 2.   Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) Elements 
(from Bohnwagner, 2013a). 
In 2006, the Energy and Security Group (ESG) designed and developed the 
Sustain the Mission Project (SMP) methodology used to calculate the FBCF associated 
with U.S. Army missions. The resulting SMP Decision Support Tool has been used by 
the U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency to support operational, logistic, and 
requirements planning. In 2012, the ESG further expanded the scope and capabilities of 
the SMP Decision Support Tool; now renamed the fully burdened cost (FBC) tool 
(Energy and Security Group, 2015a). The current version of the FBC tool (version 4.0), 
effective in 2012, provides FBCF cost and (benefits) estimates for fuel supply convoy 
casualties (avoided), fuel resupply convoy soldier threat exposure (hours avoided), fuel 
consumption (gallons saved), fuel supply truck miles (freed up for other missions), 
aviation fuel transport hours (freed up for other missions), convoy protection gun truck 
miles (freed up for other missions), convoy protection aviation system hours (freed up for 
other missions), and dollars (avoided) (Energy and Security Group, 2015b). 
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To illustrate the price impacts of the FBCF elements, initial estimates done by 
OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the Institute for Defense Analyses 
(IDA) calculated that the price for delivering fuel to the battlefield was around $15 per 
gallon, not including costs associated with force protection for convoys. Other estimates 
include $42 per gallon for fuel delivered in-flight, and “several hundreds of dollars per 
gallon for fuel delivered to isolated F.O.B.s deep in the battlespace” (DOD, 2008, p. 30). 
The AMSAA study used the initial version of this tool (the Sustain the Mission Project 
Tool) to calculate a range of FBCF prices for analysis during their Tent Foam Insulation 
Cost Benefit Analysis conducted in 2009, yielding a FBCF range from $13.80 per gallon 
to $30 per gallon (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
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III. CLOSED-CELL SPRAY FOAM INSULATION FOR ENERGY 
REDUCTION 
A. CLOSED-CELL SPRAY FOAM DEVELOPMENT 
The development of polyurethane, a component of CCSF insulation, is credited to 
Doctor Otto Bayer. The U.S. military began using polyurethane during World War II as a 
replacement for scarce rubber resources. As the versatility of the organic polymer was 
further developed, it was used in other military applications such as chemical warfare 
resistant garments, aircraft finishes, and chemical and corrosion-resistant coatings 
(American Chemistry Council Inc., 2015e). As a result of the war, polyurethane’s 
characteristics became applicable to the civilian sector throughout various commercial 
industries. Polyurethane was used to manufacture cushioning flexible foams used in the 
upholstery and auto industries. Today, polyurethanes are found in various everyday 
products such as household items, furniture, clothing, and home construction materials 
(American Chemistry Council Inc., 2015e). 
In the 1950s, the invention of the “blendometer” by Walter Baughman expanded 
polyurethane’s commercial use. The blendometer mixed various chemicals, yielding a 
new type of material known as polyurethane foam (Polyurethane Foam Association, 
2010), which did not see wide-scale use until the early 1960s. In 1963, after the 
development of spray technology, polyurethane foam was able to be applied as a home 
insulation material and is currently used in modern construction practices  
(InovateUs Inc., 2013). 
Significant energy savings are realized through the application of spray foam due 
to the material’s insulating properties and its ability to conform to a wide variety of 
irregular insulation application sites. According to the American Chemistry Council, 
spray foam provides a superior weatherproof sealant and seamless layer of insulation in 
current construction practices. The versatility of spray foam insulation allows it to be 
used during new construction as well as in preexisting structures. 
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B. CLOSED-CELL SPRAY FOAM PHYSICAL PROPERTIES 
1. R-Values/Moisture/Vapor/Air/Sound 
R-value is one of the most significant characteristics of spray foam when 
choosing among alternative insulation products. R-value relates to the insulating 
material’s ability to resist heat flow. Higher R-values provide a greater degree of 
insulating properties, yielding lower energy costs and fuel consumption. Table 3 
compares CCSF and open cell spray foam (OCSF) material properties, most notably 
showing CCSF with an R-value almost twice that of OCSF, clearly indicating that CCSF 
is superior to OCSF in most applications. 
 
Table 3.   Side-by-side comparison between closed cell and open cell spray 
foam (from American Chemistry Council Inc., 2015c). 
2. Ballistic Protection 
Protection of military personnel is often achieved through installation 
construction, perimeter control, structure standoff distances, and antiterrorism force 
protection measures and training. The unified facilities criteria for “Non-Permanent DOD 
Facilities in Support of Military Operations,” which establishes the construction criteria 
for military structures, acknowledges that most expeditionary structures cannot be 
sufficiently retrofitted or hardened to counter higher threats. In the absence of adequate 
standoff distances, expeditionary structures may not comply with unified facilities criteria 
standards listed in the DOD Antiterrorism Standards for New and Existing Buildings 
(DOD, 2012b). Expeditionary force forward operating base (FOB) locations are often 
dictated to ground force commands (GFCs) from higher command, with locations chosen 
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for strategic, operational, or tactical advantage over site placement. Because FOB 
locations vary based on operational requirements, compliance with force protection 
standards and practices is not always feasible. Therefore, cost-effective measures should 
be employed when possible. 
Traditional, forward-deployed building materials do not provide much in terms of 
ballistic protection. As such, additional ballistic protection has to be erected to provide 
adequate protection for structures such as the addition of Hesco barriers or construction 
of concrete T-walls. In 2008, at a FOB near Baqubah, Iraq, CCSF displayed an unproven 
ballistic protection characteristic during an enemy attack, preventing shrapnel from an 
enemy round from penetrating a CCSF-coated structure. Personnel discovered that 
shrapnel thrown by the round hit several structures and vehicles, causing external damage 
(see Figure 5). Military personnel on the ground later assessed the round to be a  
107-millimeter rocket. Despite the damage to the surrounding area, the spray-foamed 
structure—approximately 80–100 yards away from the round’s impact zone—appeared 
to prevent the shrapnel from penetrating the structure (see Figure 6) (Mason Knowles 
Consulting LLC, 2015). 
 .  
Figure 5.  Damage to a metal building and the tailgate of a pick-up truck 
approximately 50 yards from the impact site of the 107mm rocket 
(from Mason Knowles Consulting LLC, 2015). 
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Figure 6.  CCSF-sprayed military tent resists shrapnel penetration; October 17, 2008 
(from Mason Knowles Consulting LLC, 2015). 
3. Chemical Components 
The two chemical components of CCSF remain separated in equal amounts, 
commonly referred to as side-A and side-B. According to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the side-A component is comprised of very reactive chemicals known as 
isocyanates, while side-B is primarily comprised of a polyol that reacts with the 
isocyanates of side-A to create the polyurethane. Other chemicals are added, such as 
flame-retardants, blowing agents, and surfactants, to complete the reactive process 
(Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2015b). CCSF isocyanates present a 
significant chemical exposure concern, as minimal contact can result in breathing-related 
complications that could be fatal. 
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4. Cure Times 
The cure time for CCSF insulation is the duration it takes for the foam 
components to reach a fully hardened state once applied and depends on various factors, 
such as temperature and humidity. Estimates vary from as little as one hour for single 
component spray foams, to as much as 8 to 24 hours for OCSF or CCSF. Due to the 
significant health hazards, the EPA stresses to err on the side of caution and consult with 
a product application contractor and manufacturer for reentry periods (EPA, 2015c). 
5. Shipping/Storage 
Spray foam chemical component’s shipping and storage requirements must be 
satisfied in accordance with manufacture instructions in addition to U.S. military, United 
States Department of Transportation, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
and EPA requirements, as applicable. Failure to follow proper storage and transportation 
requirements could result in fire, explosion, the components being rendered unusable, or 
adverse health effects from chemical exposure. Side-A and side-B chemical components 
have specific warnings related to each. The storage of the components should ensure that 
an appropriate distance is maintained before, during, and after use to prevent contact with 
water, acids, or reactive chemicals. Additionally, the user should ensure that containers 
are sealed when not in use to prevent moisture infiltration and off gassing (American 
Chemistry Council Inc., 2010). 
6. Disposal 
The disposal of spray foam components and containers should be done in 
accordance with current federal, state, and local laws and regulations. Additionally, users 
should comply with the chemical container safety data sheet and consult with the 
manufacturer regarding proper waste disposal. Currently, cured spray foam can be 
disposed of as nonhazardous waste by incineration or burial (American Chemistry 
Council Inc., 2015b). 
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7. Health Hazards and Concerns 
The EPA has indicated that there are serious health risks associated with the 
airborne aerosols, mists, and vapors that result from spray foam application. During the 
application process, workers and others in the immediate area can be exposed to 
chemicals that could result in irritation and chronic lung disease. In addition, exposure to 
the eye and the skin of unprotected areas of the body can also be potentially hazardous. 
Manufacturer-recommended, personal protective equipment is required during 
application (EPA, 2015d). To reduce the health risks resulting from exposure, the EPA 
outlines several workplace ventilation best practices and principles. By incorporating 
these practices and principles, personnel are less susceptible to chemical exposure. 
Additional measures should be taken to ensure that personnel not directly involved in the 
application process, but in close proximity to the application site, are aware of the 
hazards and chemical exposure risks. 
C. CLOSED-CELL SPRAY FOAM COMMERCIAL APPLICATION 
There are three types of spray foam insulation available on the commercial 
market. The first is one-component foam, typically used by do-it-yourself 
nonprofessionals or homeowners for small job applications such as weatherizing a home. 
The one-component foam is premixed, ready to use, and comes prepackaged in a 12–24 
ounce can similar to spray paint. This foam is typically used to seal around pipes; 
windows and door seals; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning duct work (see 
Figure 7). The one-component foam can also be used in repair work or applications 
similar to those pictured below. 
   
Figure 7.  One-component spray polyurethane foam application options 
(from American Chemistry Council Inc., 2015d). 
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Larger-scale projects require different material characteristics satisfied by either a 
two-component, OCSF or CCSF insulation. Both variations provide unique 
environmental protection properties and characteristics. OCSF, as the nomenclature 
indicates, consists of an open cell-structure filled with air, resulting in a soft, low-density 
product (Spray Polyurethane Foam Alliance, 2013). The low-density characteristic results 
in a more aggressive expansion during application and curing, resulting in a thicker  
end product. 
OCSF provides increased benefits over other insulation systems by providing a 
more capable barrier to moisture, vapor, sound, and external climate variations  
(see Figure 8). The OCSF is applied with a low-pressure system, typically less than  
250 pounds per square inch (psi), and provides greater ability to resist conductive heat 
transfer, with an R-value of approximately 3.5 per inch of spray foam (American 
Chemistry Council Inc., 2015a). R-value is the measure of the material’s thermal 
resistance used in the building and construction industry. Thicker application of  
low-density OCSF may be required to meet desired insulating requirements. 
 
Figure 8.  Open-Cell Spray Foam (from EPA, 2015a). 
The CCSF contains a closed-cell structure that traps insulating gases, called 
blowing agents, which have a lower thermal conductivity than air and increases the 
product’s R-value (Spray Polyurethane Foam Alliance, 2013). CCSF is a denser and 
more expensive material than OCSF that expands less aggressively, requiring less 
material during application to meet desired insulation properties and characteristics  
(see Figure 9). CCSF is applied with a high-pressure system, typically 800–1,600 pounds 
  26 
per square inch, providing R-values of 6 per inch. Additionally, CCSF components are 
packaged in 55-gallon drums for larger applications (EPA, 2015a). CCSF provides 
significant cost savings over OCSF, when used in large volumes, due to its increased 
insulation properties and ability to procure in larger quantities. 
 
Figure 9.  CCSF two-component, professional, high-pressured system foam 
application (from EPA, 2015a). 
D. CLOSED-CELL SPRAY FOAM MILITARY APPLICATION 
(ENERGY/FUEL REDUCTION) 
Since the July 2006 JUONS the DOD has used foam insulation throughout the 
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command areas of responsibility, both in 
controlled testing environments and under field conditions in forward-deployed locations. 
Synovision Solutions conducted the initial testing and demonstration of external foam 
application at Fort Benning, Georgia in December 2006. Gaco Western 193 foam, a  
low-density, rigid polyurethane insulation, was applied to a single tent, yielding a  
“92 percent reduction in energy” (Sprayfoam.com Inc., 2015, p. 1) used power heating 
and cooling systems (see Figure 10). The Fort Benning demonstration showed that EITS 
foam application “can reduce the number of generators by 50%” and that the “insulated 
tents require 75–90% less power than non-insulated tents” (AFCESA, 2010, p. 5). 
Reduced energy demand for the insulated tents resulted from the removal of half of the 
environmental control units needed to maintain predetermined interior temperatures 
(GAO, 2009). In addition to the reduction in energy demand, the foam insulation 
increased indoor air quality from the reduction in dust, dirt, and other debris. The foam 
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insulation also reduced exterior noise penetration, providing better quality of life 
characteristics for the tents’ inhabitants (GAO, 2009). 
 
Figure 10.  GP-L tent before and after external application of spray foam insulation, 
Fort Benning, Georgia, 2007 (from GAO, 2009). 
1. National Training Center – Net Zero Plus – Project Eskimo 
In 2007, the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force conducted a Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, 
California. The demonstration analyzed available renewable energy technologies with a 
goal of achieving military installation energy independence from established power grids. 
One technology tested was the application of spray foam insulation to expeditionary 
military berthing tents to determine the effects on temperature regulation and energy use. 
This effort, termed Project Eskimo, was deployed throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti, 
and Kuwait for field demonstration purposes and became the proof of concept for future 
foaming contracts. The aim of the project was to cover 79 temporary structures to 
measure energy efficiencies gained with the application of foam insulation (Null, 2010). 
According to U.S. Army officials, the project yielded a 40%-75% energy savings, 
reached fiscal break-even point in 178 days, and saved over $194 million from initial 
deployment through February 2010 (Null, 2010).  
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2. Employment of Foam Insulation in Forward-Deployed Locations 
In 2007, the U.S. Army Developmental Test Command approved spray foam 
insulation for use, enabling the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force to solicit and award 
contracts for foam application. In May 2007, the Army conducted a demonstration in 
Kuwait by spray foaming semipermanent berthing tents and other base support structures. 
Foam application resulted in an approximately 20%-40% reduction in energy use (see 
Figure 11) (AFCESA, 2010). 
 
Figure 11.  Foam insulation applied to tents in Kuwait (from AFCESA, 2010). 
In 2006, leadership at Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Camp 
Lemonier, Djibouti, requested assistance from the U.S. Army with an increasing energy 
demand due to ongoing camp expansion projects. In July 2007, the REF awarded a 
contract to Glencoe Roofing Company to apply spray foam insulation to the external 
surface of the base gym at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti (see Figure 12) (McCarty, 2015). 
Prior to the foam’s application, the gym required five ECUs to maintain internal gym 
temperatures, averaging 95 to 100 degrees Fahrenheit (F) (GAO, 2009). After 
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application, two of the five ECUs were removed and internal temperatures averaged 72 
degrees F, resulting in a fuel savings of approximately 40% (GAO, 2009). 
 
Figure 12.  Exterior foam application to Camp Lemonier Gym, Djibouti  
(from Nolan, 2015). 
In coordination with the U.S. Army REF, Synovision Solutions was asked to 
provide project leadership and services to conduct initial testing at Camp Victory in 
Baghdad, Iraq. A large gym, formerly an aviation maintenance facility, was picked to 
conduct the initial application due to its high-energy demand. Prior to the foam’s 
application, the gym required eight ECUs, running 24 hours a day, to maintain an internal 
temperature of approximately 92 degrees F, depending on the time of day. After 
application, six of the eight ECUs were removed and the remaining two maintained an 
internal temperature of approximately 72 degrees F. As a result of the successful testing, 
in April 2008, the U.S. Army authorized $95 million in contracts to foam up to nine 
million square feet of external structure surface area throughout Iraq (Sprayfoam.com 
Inc., 2015). Brigadier General Anderson, the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics 
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(G-4), stated that the U.S. military was saving “$2 million a day” (Osborn, 2009, p. 1) in 
Iraq from the 1,200 structures that were foamed. The foam application was said to drop 
the average internal temperature of a tent in Iraq by 22 degrees F (Osborn, 2009). 
Honeywell International was contracted by Multi-National Corps-Iraq to apply spray 
foam insulation to approximately 900 existing base structures, costing $12.5 million, to 
further increase overall fuel efficiency and reduce the energy demand (see Figure 13) 
(Urethanes Technology International, 2009). 
 
Figure 13.  Honeywell employee applies terra strong foam to structures in Iraq 
(from Urethanes Technology International, 2009). 
After successful performance demonstrations, Relyant, LLC, formally the Critical 
Mission Support Services, was awarded a $32 million contract, with an additional  
$7 million extension, to provide spray foam application services in Afghanistan 
(Sprayfoam.com Inc., 2010). Relyant began applying Gaco Western Polyfoam System 
193 from late 2008 through 2009 to semipermanent structures at FOBs spread throughout 
Afghanistan, as well as at Bagram Air Field (see Figure 14). In January 2009, Synovision 
Solutions and Honeywell International were contracted to supply insulation materials to 
foam 500 to 600 semipermanent structures in a continuing effort to further lessen fuel 
dependence (Osborn, 2009). 
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Figure 14.  Relyant, LLC employee applies spray foam insulation to a tent structure in 
Afghanistan (from Sprayfoam.com Inc., 2010). 
  
  32 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  33 
IV. CCSF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes a detailed look at the following issues: 
• The steps of the CBA 
• The factors that create value or cost to the military 
• The decision criteria evaluation process 
It also evaluates the utility of CCSF insulation for military structures; specifically, 
three tent types. The eight-step CBA process quantifies the numerous costs and benefits 
of the military’s use of CCSF insulation and suggests decision-making criteria and 
weighting for alternative selections. The CBA was conducted from the DOD perspective 
and does not account for societal externalities. 
The CBA process is used by the various branches of the government and military 
to determine the benefit of acquiring items for military use. The total cost of closed-cell 
spray foam implementation goes beyond procurement and associated life-cycle costs. 
Placing a monetary value on the costs and benefits of CCSF implementation requires an 
analysis of how various stakeholders value the item. The CBA is critical to monetizing 
the costs and benefits of CCSF insulation for military use and aids in the decision-making 
process. 
1. Application of Cost Benefit Analysis 
The Army’s eight-step CBA process was used to evaluate the feasibility of CCSF 
insulation application for the military. It also provides an accepted method used by 
military and government officials to make critical procurement decisions for future 
expenditures. Additionally, the CBA process allows decision makers to comprehend the 
methodology used in this analysis. 
The eight-step CBA process ensures that all factors are evaluated to determine the 
overall costs and benefits of acquiring CCSF. 
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• Step 1 defines the problems or potential opportunities associated with CCSF 
procurement and implementation. The main problem addressed in this 
analysis is the exorbitant fuel use required for berthing and office area climate 
control. 
• Step 2 identifies the facts, assumptions, and constraints used to evaluate the 
costs and benefits. 
• Step 3 identifies possible alternatives for the procurement and use of CCSF 
insulation for semipermanent, deployed structures. These alternatives provide 
decision makers with different options to evaluate the implementation of 
CCSF use. 
• Step 4 develops the total quantifiable and nonquantifiable cost estimates for 
each of the alternatives. These costs are evaluated and analyzed to determine 
the true cost of each alternative. 
• Step 5 identifies the quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits produced from 
each alternative. In order to properly weigh the benefits against the costs, 
nonquantifiable benefits will have to be monetized by placing a dollar value 
on the benefit. The dollar value will represent the value to the end user and the 
military’s willingness to pay for that benefit. 
• Step 6 identifies weighting criteria used for decision making when selecting 
alternatives. 
The final two steps of the CBA process determine an actual value of each alternative and 
provide selection recommendations. 
• Step 7 combines the costs and benefits of each alternative, yielding an overall 
net value or benefit. 
• Step 8 is a sensitivity analysis of each alternative due to factors such as 
fluctuating fuel prices, the cost of CCSF materials, and time. This final step of 
the CBA reports the results of the analysis and provides a recommendation to 
decision makers on the procurement of CCSF. 
B. STEP 1: DEFINE PROBLEM/OPPORTUNITY AND SCOPE 
1. Problem Statement 
The DOD’s legacy forward-deployed structure construction practices and 
materials require an exorbitant amount of energy, in the form of petroleum products, to 
maintain base support activities and acceptable living and operating conditions for 
deployed U.S. military personnel. Wartime generator use, required to power essential 
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base support activities, consumes more energy than combat vehicles, tactical vehicles, 
and combat aircraft. According to a 2010 study conducted by the U.S. Air Force Civil 
Engineering Support Agency (AFCESA), approximately 80% of the energy produced by 
generators is used to power the ECUs necessary to heat and cool berthing, office, and 
messing structures (AFCESA, 2010). During the construction process, the application of 
energy efficient materials into legacy structures can reduce operational energy demand 
throughout the battlefield, thus yielding significant fuel savings, an increase in 
operational effectiveness and endurance, and reducing casualties associated with fuel 
transportation and protection. 
2. Objective 
The objective of this CBA is to determine and analyze the costs and benefits 
associated with CCSF application for use on new or existing forward-deployed, 
semipermanent structures. CCSF implementation can significantly alter forward-
deployed construction practices within the DOD and reduce operational energy demand 
and related costs. This research identifies, through case study and cost comparison, 
whether CCSF application to forward-deployed structures will achieve the desired 
outcome of reduced costs, increased stability, and protection for military forward-
deployed structures. 
Specific objectives include: 
• Identify CCSF quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs and benefits. 
• Compare costs and benefits between the status quo and alternative(s). 
• Calculate the CCSF application annual net benefit (e.g., return on investment 
[ROI], net present value [NPV], and the break-even period [BEP]). 
• Develop a CCSF net benefit formula per structure (three tent types). 
• Demonstrate how CCSF application fits into current DOD operational energy 
initiatives. 
• Provide CCSF usage recommendations. 
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3. Voice of the Stakeholders 
Stakeholders, as defined by the U.S. Army CBA Guide, are those “customers, 
functional process owners, or end users” of the product or services that have a voice in 
the decision-making process or are directly affected by the CBA results. For this CBA, 
stakeholders are broken down into the following functional categories: 
• CCSF requirements stakeholders; 
• CCSF solicitation and selection stakeholders; 
• CCSF user stakeholders; and 
• other CCSF stakeholders. (Department of the Army [DoA], 2013, p. 14) 
a. CCSF Requirements Stakeholders 
 The primary requirements stakeholder, and key decision maker, identified for this 
CBA is the Secretary of Defense, who is the final approval authority for program of 
records submitted to the Congress for authorization and appropriation. Requirements 
codified at this level are applicable to the respective service branches or the DOD as a 
whole. Policies governing and/or mandating CCSF use and application will be 
disseminated to the respective users and providers. 
 Other key requirements stakeholders are the respective combatant commanders, 
who identify combat-related needs and requirements to fulfill capability gaps. Once 
capability gaps are identified, joint and service-specific stakeholders are involved in the 
capabilities-based assessment. Decisions from this assessment lead to an analysis of 
alternatives during the material solution analysis phase of the JCIDS process. Specific 
requirements stakeholders include: 
• Secretary of Defense 
• USD (AT&L) 
• Service Secretaries 
• Joint Chiefs of Staff 
• Service Chiefs 
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• Component Acquisition Executive – Assistant Secretary of the Army  
(AT&L) 
• Program Executive Office (PEO) – U.S. Army PEO Soldier, Joint Committee 
on Tactical Shelters  
b. CCSF Solicitation and Selection Stakeholders 
 The primary solicitation and selection stakeholder and decision maker is the USD 
(AT&L). For joint programs, the office of the USD (AT&L) is the final solicitation and 
selection decision authority unless delegated to a service material command. For CCSF 
contracts, the U.S. Army Material Command is the likely designated executive agent 
responsible for contractor solicitation and selection. Once the requirement is approved, 
the U.S. Army Material Command will designate a Source Selection Authority (SSA) 
responsible for reviewing and selecting the contractor(s) who provide the best value, 
based on the requirements specified in the solicitation. Specific solicitation and selection 
stakeholders include: 
• USD(AT&L) 
• U.S. Army Material Command 
• Service SSA 
c. CCSF User Stakeholders 
CCSF user stakeholders are those associated with the product’s end use. In 
forward-deployed locations, user stakeholders span the spectrum from combatant 
commanders to the individual warfighter. Combatant commanders are the primary 
stakeholders, due to CCSF’s ability to reduce fuel demand, increase warfighter quality of 
life, and reduce mission risk associated with fuel transport, storage, and protection. 
Reduction of fuel demand also enables greater combat endurance and more efficient use 
of combat power, as combat power previously used to protect fuel convoys can now be 
assigned to support other mission objectives. Combatant commanders are ultimately 
responsible for CCSF’s successful implementation on the battlefield to achieve theater 
energy efficiency goals. 
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Individual warfighters are the ultimate end users of CCSF products and are the 
direct beneficiaries of the foam’s environmental control properties and fuel reduction 
capabilities. Improved quality of life, realized by CCSF’s application, translates into 
better performance and more effective and enduring warfighting capabilities at the 
tactical level. Less fuel translates into reduced warfighter risk associated with convoy 
protection and escort missions. Specific user stakeholders include: 
• Combatant commanders 
• Coalition commanders 
• Component commanders 
• Battlespace owners/commanders 
• FOB/COB commanders 
• Logistics battalions 
• Individual warfighters 
d. Other CCSF Stakeholders 
 Other stakeholders are those affected by CCSF’s employment throughout the 
battlefield, but are not customers, end users, or anyone involved in the functional 
processes. The largest stakeholders affected by CCSF’s use are those associated with fuel 
purchase, storage, and transport to the end user. The DESC, which is responsible for 
managing and satisfying DOD’s fuel requirements, is directly affected by major changes 
in battlefield fuel demand; specifically, volume. Other fuel-associated stakeholders 
include those responsible for its storage and transportation to the end user; including both 
domestic and international providers. 
 From a budgetary perspective, all levels of the DOD are stakeholders due to fuel 
consumption’s effect on the overall DOD budget. Volatility and instability of global fuel 
prices may require additional appropriations from Congress to fund anticipated fuel 
demand. Major changes in DOD budget requests affect Congressional appropriations 
previously authorized for other DOD programs of record. 
  39 
 From a material perspective, commercial suppliers and manufactures of forward-
deployed structures used for base infrastructure (e.g., expeditionary tents, construction 
materials, etc.) are stakeholders of CCSF’s employment. Because CCSF application 
changes the useful life and functionality of the structure it is applied to, suppliers will 
realize a change in material demands for their products. Other stakeholders include: 
• DLA 
• Military equipment manufacturers 
• Contracted construction-related labor forces (domestic and international) 
• Contracted fuel-related labor forces (domestic and international) 
• Host-nation-provided services 
• Ancillary base support equipment providers (e.g., ECUs, generators, etc.) 
• U.S. taxpayers (who are also stakeholders and are affected by the 
implementation of CCSF’s use in DOD construction practices) 
C. STEP 2: FORMULATE BOUNDARIES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 
1. Boundaries 
CBA boundaries are critical towards finding feasible and practical results for all 
alternatives within a given analysis (DoA, 2013). Setting boundaries minimizes the 
difficulties associated with alternative(s) comparison and allows for a more focused look 
at the primary criteria prioritized by decision makers. Unbounded CBAs could result in 
numerous alternatives, costs, and benefits that may have little to no effect on the CBA’s 
results (DoA, 2011). The boundaries used during this CBA keep the focus on the major 
costs and benefits of CCSF implementation, which are listed below: 
• This CBA only analyzes the costs and benefits that CCSF provides to U.S. 
military berthing structures; specifically, frame tents, GP-M tents, and  
GP-L tents. 
• CCSF-insulated structures analyzed are those anticipated to be occupied for a 
minimum of one year due to the availability of published annual fuel 
consumption figures for the respective structures that are analyzed. 
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• CCSF-insulated structures analyzed are those at forward-deployed locations. 
This CBA does not analyze CCSF use at current military posts with 
permanent structures. 
2. Assumptions 
The Army CBA Guide defines assumptions as “conditions that must exist or 
events that must occur in order for the recommended COA to be successfully 
implemented” (DoA, 2013, p. 26). Assumptions used during this CBA are: 
• The U.S. military will continue to use assets in existing inventories—
specifically frame, GP-M, and GP-L tents—as expeditionary structures in 
forward-deployed locations due to their existing integration in military 
doctrine. The procurement costs associated with the three tents are treated as 
sunk and irrelevant in the cost and benefit calculations because they are 
included in an operational unit’s standard Mission Table of Organization and 
Equipment (MTOE). This assumption is required in order to provide the cost 
benefit analysis of CCSF’s effect on fuel reduction and other benefits 
associated with current and projected military berthing structures. 
• The U.S. military will continue to employ semipermanent expeditionary 
structures in forward-deployed locations for berthing purposes to support 
mobility requirements dictated by mission requirements. Semipermanent 
structures have flexible, useful field lives, enabling their use for a variety of 
missions and mission durations. Due to the unknown duration of military 
operations, semipermanent structures offer flexibility to deployed forces. This 
assumption is required to reflect the temporary and varying nature of expected 
future military operations.  
• Generator sets are assumed to be the primary source of power generation due 
to the unreliable nature or absence of local power sources or infrastructures in 
forward-deployed locations. The U.S. military will continue to use fossil fuels, 
specifically JP-8, in generator sets because of its universal use to power 
combat vehicles, aircraft, or auxiliary base support equipment. This 
assumption allows the CBA to remove the effects of outside power sources 
(i.e., local power grids) to focus the analysis on CCSF’s effect on fuel 
reduction and other corresponding second- and third-order effects (i.e., 
reduced convoy operations, casualty reduction, mission effectiveness, etc.). 
• Future CCSF service is assumed to be provided by commercial contractors 
due to the lack of organic military skill sets. Contractors also present a more 
cost-effective solution than creating an organic military capability. CCSF-
related components are assumed to be readily available in the public/private 
markets to fulfill U.S. military demands when called on. This assumption 
allows the cost benefit analysis to focus on one method of CCSF 
implementation that is assumed to be used in future projects due to the 
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significant costs related to establishing and maintaining an organic military 
capability. 
3. Constraints 
Data used for the CBA is constrained by available information retrieved from 
historical studies and/or past field employment. The ability to test CCPF on berthing 
areas for the sole purpose of this CBA is not feasible due to lack of available funding, 
time, and industry support. The data analyzed for this CBA only addresses the use of 
CCSF on berthing areas (three types) in Asia and the Middle East. As such, climate 
conditions and structure type may vary depending on employment location. The lack of 
CCPF testing in diverse climates, locations, and weather constrains this study from 
providing a general analysis for all forward-deployed structures and locations. 
Constraints used during the analysis are: 
• Structure (three tent types) fuel consumption data is only available from 
historical CCSF use in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Djibouti. 
• Foam contract costs are based on historical awarded contracts executed in 
Asia and the Middle East. Obtaining current CCSF prices from possible 
suppliers is impossible due to the DOD’s unauthorized commitment policy. 
• CCSF insulation application can only be conducted by contracted personnel. 
• DOD fuel prices used during the analysis are retrieved from historical DESC 
fuel standard prices for JP-8. 
• MBA project completion time frame is constrained to six months, thereby 
limiting the scope of research time. 
D. STEP 3: DEFINE ALTERNATIVES 
1. Introduction 
This analysis compared the costs and benefits of three structures—a frame tent, a 
GP-M tent, and a GP-L tent—versus the alternative course of action: the three tent 
structures with foam insulation applied externally. Each unfoamed structure was 
compared to its foamed counterpart to determine costs and benefits from the foam 
application and structure size and characteristics. The characteristics chosen to compare 
foamed versus unfoamed structures are based on characteristics that differ between the 
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status quo and the alternative (see Table 4). The characteristics chosen are key decision 
factors when deciding which structure best suits operational needs and field situations. 
Category Status Quo: Uninsulated Tent Structures 
Alt: CCSF-Insulated Tent 
Structures 
Structure Purpose  Berthing Berthing 
Employment Location Forward-deployed Forward-deployed 
Personnel Requirements Military Military and contractor 
Set-Up Time Less than 24 hours More than 24 hours 
Mobility Mobile Semipermanent 
Disposal None. Redeployment Disposal required 
Field Useful Life Three years Five years and greater 
Structure Capital Outlay None; structures in existing 
inventory 
None; structures in existing 
inventory 
Quality of Life Low Improved (nonquantifiable) 
Energy Efficiency Low Approximately 50% greater 
Maintenance Low Low 
Health Factors Dust, noise, humidity 
intrusion; drastic temperature 
variation; semipermeable 
material 
Large reduction in dust, 
noise, and humidity; constant 
temperature; nonpermeable 
material 
Structural Rigidity Acceptable Improved structural integrity 
Implementation No changes required Requires additional policy 
and training 
Table 4.   Alternative comparison. 
2. The Status Quo 
Current military structures employed throughout the battlefield consist of 
uninsulated tents, wooden structures (e.g., Barracks Hut, Southwest Asia Hut), barrel 
structures, and containerized living units (CLUs). These structures are erected 
uninsulated and may or may not incorporate thermal shading, in the form of a camouflage 
netting system, installed above the structure’s roofing. The status quo for this analysis is 
the three unfoamed tent structures (frame tent, GP-M, and GP-L). These structures 
provide a representative snapshot of the standard berthing structures currently employed 
throughout forward-deployed locations. 
  43 
The three status quo structures are current DOD inventory items, utilized by all 
services and commonly employed during the initial and follow-on phases of military 
operations. They meet current military specifications for use as dictated by the DOD 
4120.24-M established by the USD (AT&L). These structures are incorporated into the 
Joint Forward Operations Base (JFOB) Survivability and Protective Construction 
Handbook (Ground Test Article 90–01-011), which dictates their recommended use and 
employment during FOB establishment. Military personnel responsible for expeditionary 
operations are routinely trained on tent construction during the training and work-up 
phases of their respective deployment training cycles. 
3. Documenting the Status Quo 
a. Material Costs 
Status quo structure material costs per unit were retrieved from the DLA – 
Defense Logistics Information Service (DLIS), found at www.dlis.dla.mil/webflis, using 
their respective national stock numbers (NSNs). Tent component costs were also 
retrieved from the DLIS website to account for replacement costs associated with 
standard tent use, maintenance, and component’s operational field life. Tent component 
NSNs were extracted from the respective technical manuals. 
b. Fuel Consumption Associated With ECUs 
Fuel consumption amounts associated with each tent were retrieved from the  
U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity engineering analysis conducted in 2009 
under battlefield conditions. The engineering analysis used “principles of heat transfer 
and historical weather data to predict the amount of energy required to heat and cool the 
interior of the respective status quo structures located in multiple locations throughout 
Iraq” (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010, p. 7). Using the average change in fuel consumption in 
gallons per year, and percentages realized from the foam insulation application (see  
Table 5) provided by the AMSAA engineering analysis, this original, unfoamed, annual 
fuel consumption in gallons per year was calculated as seen below: 
• Formula 1: Average change in fuel consumption (gal/yr)/percentage change 
= unfoamed fuel consumption (gal/yr) 
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• Formula 2: Unfoamed fuel consumption (gal/yr)–Average change in fuel 
consumption due to foam application (gal/yr)=Annual fuel consumption 
(gal/yr) with foam application 
 
Annual Average Fuel Consumption per Tent (Iraq and Afghanistan) 
 Unfoamed Structure (gal) 
Foamed 
Structure (gal) 
Fuel Consumption Reduction 
(gal) 
Frame Tent 10,573 4,652 5,921 (56%) 
GP-M 10,600 4,664 5,936 (56%) 
GP-L 14,488 5,215 9,272 (64%) 
Table 5.   Average annual fuel consumption per tent 
 (after Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
c. Fuel Convoy Requirements 
Fuel convoy requirements are calculated by dividing the annual fuel use in gallons 
per year of each respective status quo structure by the standard 2,500-gallon and  
5,000-gallon U.S. Army fuel tanker trucks (see Table 6). 





2,500-gal. Fuel Trucks 5,000-gal. Fuel Trucks 
Frame Tent 10,573 4.23 2.11 
GP-M 10,600 4.24 2.12 
GP-L 14,488 5.80 2.90 
Table 6.   Annual fuel truck requirement per tent 
(after Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
4. Define Alternative Course(s) of Action 
For this analysis, there are two courses of action considered: the status quo 
(unfoamed structures) and the alternative (foamed structures). These courses of action are 
compared using the characteristics outlined previously in Table 4. 
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a. Alternative – Foamed Structures 
The alternative course of action is defined as the three status quo structures, with 
foam insulation applied externally. Current DOD policy requires that foam insulation is 
applied by “factory authorized and trained contractor personnel” (AFCESA, 2010, p. 6) 
to ensure correct application and responsible use of the material. DOD personnel were 
not considered to apply CCSF insulation during this analysis. CCSF insulation is only 
applied to the external surface of the three structures, utilizing the original structure’s 
framework for support. CCSF application increases energy efficiency, provides 
additional structural integrity, and provides a barrier from environmental conditions. 
Additionally, the application of foam insulation removes the expeditionary characteristics 
of the structure, rendering the exterior tent cover unrecoverable. Because of this, 
consideration is required when determining which structures to foam. As of 2010, three 
commercial-off-the-shelf foam products are authorized for use by the U.S. military: Gaco 
Western Polyfoam System 193, BASF Spraytite System 158 with BASF TERRAStrong 
Acrylic Coating 7261, and Baysystems Bayseal 2.0 Foam System (AFCESA, 2010). 
Additional safety considerations are required when employing CCSF due to the chemical 
characteristics of the foam material. Considerations include two exits of egress from the 
structure, installation of smoke detectors, a wait time prior to occupancy, minimum air 
volume exchange rates, and specific electrical safety standards. Disposal considerations 
need to be accounted for prior to its application, due to the foam’s one-time use 
characteristics. 
5. Identify Second and Third Order Effects (Alternative) 
Second and third order effects are those that arise from the implementation of the 
alternative course of action and must be considered during the decision process. These 
effects may have financial or operational consequences for other DOD agencies or 
departments whose procedures may require modification when choosing the alternative 
course of action. Despite the cost savings from CCSF insulation, implementation of the 
alternative may result in contractor dependence, increased disposal costs, acquisition 
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budget opportunity costs, loss in combat force mobility, and contractor retainer related 
costs and agreements. 
a. Contractor Dependence 
Contractor dependence from CCSF use increases due to the technical 
requirements associated with product application. Current military personnel do not 
possess the applicable skill sets or the organic equipment required for CCSF application 
or handling. 
b. Disposal Costs 
The U.S. military will incur additional disposal costs associated with the disposal 
or removal of CCSF structures. Current disposal costs for unfoamed structures are 
minimal, due to their ability to be turned over to the host nation or redeployed with U.S. 
forces due to their expeditionary nature. Tents become semipermanent when foamed, 
requiring disposal in accordance with host nation environmental policies and regulations. 
c. Acquisition Budget Opportunity Cost 
Funds associated with the procurement and sourcing of CCSF contracts remove 
funding resources available from other DOD programs of record. Prioritization of 
program requirements is necessary to offset the resulting impacts to other programs 
competing for funding. Despite the expected cost savings resulting from the decrease in 
fuel demand, fuel savings will not be directly reallocated to the acquisition budget. 
d. Lost Mobility 
CCSF application removes the expeditionary functionality of the structure  
(e.g., frame tents, GP-M, GP-L). As a result, additional tents are required to be held in 
reserve to meet expeditionary requirements of the respective units. Additionally, foamed 
structures are unable to be redeployed and/or reused once established. CCSF 
implementation will increase the overall DOD procurement and on-hand inventory levels 
of tents required by expeditionary forces. 
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e. Contractor Retainer 
CCSF component shelf life and storage requirements mandate just-in-time 
sourcing, making inventory stockpiling and prepositioning of materials impractical. 
Additionally, specialized CCSF application equipment is required and thus does not 
justify the capital expenditures for the DOD. Due to these reasons, it is cost beneficial to 
the DOD to maintain CCSF contractors on a retainer to provide needed services to 
support mission requirements, as they arise. 
f. CCSF Safety Training 
Current military doctrine and training does not cover the hazards associated with 
CCSF-insulated structures. CCSF requires specific safety precautions during application 
and while occupying the structures. As such, additional time and resources are required to 
ensure safe and proper use of the foamed structures. 
E. STEP 4: IDENTIFY AND ESTIMATE QUANTIFIABLE AND 
NONQUANTIFIABLE COSTS 
This section examines the quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs associated with 
the alternative course of action: the application of CCSF insulation to the three tent 
structures. Costs are categorized as quantifiable and nonquantifiable. Market valuation 
methods are used to determine quantifiable financial costs. Examples of quantifiable 
financial costs include structure and structure component costs, and CCSF foam 
application costs. Nonquantifiable costs are those that cannot be measured numerically, 
but are incurred at the expense of CCSF implementation and integration into existing 
construction practices. 
1. Quantifiable Costs 
Quantifiable costs associated with CCSF implementation include the material, 
application, and structure replacement costs. Material costs are determined by the 
quantity of CCSF materials, stipulated by the CCSF contract, and the market valuation of 
the materials such as price per square foot. Application costs are those that include the 
transportation, labor, and physical application of CCSF insulation associated with the 
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designated structures. Structure replacement costs are those that result from the 
anticipated or planned duration of use of the tent structures in the combat environment.  If 
combat use exceeds the structure’s useful life, structure replacement is necessary and 
incurs additional costs to meet the combat requirements.  
a. Material Costs 
Structure material expenditures are included as a quantifiable cost due to their 
unrecoverable nature and need for replacement after CCSF application. Including 
structure material costs into the CBA ensures that maximum costs are analyzed 
representing a worst-case scenario. Structure material costs per unit were retrieved from 
the DLA–DLIS, found at www.dlis.dla.mil/webflis, using their respective NSNs. Tent 
component costs were also retrieved from the DLIS website to account for replacement 
costs associated with standard tent use, maintenance, and the component’s operational 
field life. Tent component NSNs were extracted from their respective technical manuals. 
Tent costs are summarized in Table 7. 
Tent Component Costs 
Component NSN Cost (2015BY$) 
Frame Tent (Complete) 8340-00-880-2622 $1,365 
Frame Tent (Cover) 8340-00-753-6570 $964 
GP-M (Complete) 8340-01-329-7478 $2,579 
GP-M (Cover) 8340-01-477-9567 $1,250 
GP-L (Complete) 8340-01-329-7479 $4,003 
GP-L (Cover) 8340-00-285-5596 $2,280 
Table 7.   Tent component costs  
(after Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], 2015). 
Once foamed, the original tent cover material becomes permanently bonded to the 
CCSF insulation, rendering it unusable. The original internal framing components of the 
respective tents can be reused and are unaffected by the foam application. Thus, the only 
consumable component expended during foam application is the respective tent covering. 
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b. Foam Application Costs 
Foam application costs were derived from AMSAA Cost Analysis Study data, 
using the 2009 EITS contract of $95 million (2008BY$) to foam approximately  
13.5 million square feet of external structure surface area (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
Foam cost per square foot is calculated as: 
• Foam cost/sq ft = 2009 EITS contract price (2008BY$)/Contract-stipulated 
square footage to be applied with CCSF insulation = Price/sq ft (2008BY$). 
• Foam cost/sq ft = $95,000,000 (2008BY$)/13,500,000 sq ft = $7.04/sq ft 
(2008BY$). 
Adjustment for inflation from 2008 BY dollars to 2014 BY dollars was calculated 
using the joint inflation calculator (JIC) from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis. The 
calculation utilized the Military Construction Army Appropriation/Cost Element, 
converting from 2008 BY dollars to 2014 BY dollars yielding and an inflation factor of 
1.1212. Foam price per square foot equaled $7.90 (2014BY$). Foam costs per square foot 
include those associated with transportation (air, sea, and ground), material storage, 
application, and project management. Foam costs per tent were based on the total 
external surface area requiring application (see Table 8). 
Tent Structure Types and Characteristics 
Structure Type Material Type Internal Footprint (sq ft) 
Total External Surface 
Area (sq ft) 
Frame Tent PVC Fabric 660 1,533 
GP-M PVC Fabric 666 1,575 
GP-L PVC Fabric 999 2,193 
Table 8.   Tent Structure Types and Characteristics  
(after Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
Calculating foam application cost per tent structure is accomplished by 
multiplying the cost per square foot of foam, $7.90, by the respective external surface 
areas of the three tents. Foam application costs range from $12,111 for a frame tent, to 
$17,325 for a GP-L. Table 9 summarizes the foam application costs per structure. 
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Frame Tent 660 1,533 $12,111 
GP-M 666 1,575 $12,443 
GP-L 999 2,193 $17,325 
Table 9.   CCSF application costs per structure (after Foulkner & Wilke, 
2010). 
c. Structure Replacement Costs 
The useful life of the three tent structures analyzed during this CBA can vary, 
depending on deployment locations, environmental factors, and anticipated use. This 
analysis assumed a three-year useful life for unfoamed tents and a five-year useful life for 
foamed tents. Useful life duration assumptions are required to conduct an analysis of the 
potential quantifiable financial benefits associated with CCSF application. CCSF 
insulation application extends the useful life of the tent structure by covering the exterior 
material with a weather-resistant, elastomeric coating. Once fully cured, CCSF insulation 
materials are relatively inert, yielding negligible changes in physical properties over time. 
CCSF insulation reduces damage and degradation commonly caused by direct sun and 
ultraviolet exposure, moisture intrusion (liquid and gas form), extreme temperature 
fluctuations, and airborne hazards such as soil, sand, rock, and other materials. 
Additionally, CCSF insulation adds structural rigidity to the existing structure, making it 
less susceptible to failure from high wind forces. Useful life extension reduces 
replacement costs associated with the tent cover and/or structural members. 
Table 10 shows a comparison of the cumulative replacement costs between the 
unfoamed and foamed tents over a 12-year period. The 12-year analysis period is chosen to 
show the total cumulative replacement costs based on historical Iraq and Afghanistan mission 
durations. Replacement costs of unfoamed tents include the tent covering and internal 
structural components. Replacement costs for the foamed tents include the tent covering and 
the cost to reapply the CCSF insulation. Internal structural components are assumed to be 
recoverable and reusable for foamed structures. Foam costs are based on the tent’s external 
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square footage, multiplied by the cost per square foot of foam insulation. From a structure 
materials cost perspective, unfoamed tents are less expensive to replace than their foamed 
counterparts, despite the increase in useful life of the foamed variant. 
Cumulative Structure Replacement Material Costs (2015FY$) 
















Frame Tent - Unfoamed $0 $1,365 $2,730 $4,095 $5,460 
GP-M - Unfoamed $0 $2,579 $3,944 $5,309 $6,674 
GP-L - Unfoamed $0 $4,003 $5,368 $6,733 $8,098 
Frame Tent - Foamed $0 $12,111 $25,186 $25,186 $38,261 
GP-M - Foamed $0 $12,443 $25,850 $25,850 $38,925 
GP-L - Foamed $0 $17,325 $35,614 $35,614 $48,689 
Table 10.   Cumulative structure replacement material costs (2015BY$) –  
12-year analysis. 
2. Nonquantifiable Costs 
Nonquantifiable costs associated with CCSF implementation include location-
specific disposal costs, construction time and design modification-related costs, costs 
associated with loss of structure mobility, DOD-wide safety and training implementation 
costs, and opportunity costs that arise from alternative use of financial resources. Since 
these costs are situationally dependent, they cannot be accurately determined at the time 
of implementation but require consideration during the decision-making process.  
a. Disposal Costs 
Disposal costs may constitute the largest cost burden associated with CCSF 
insulation application. These costs are based on structure location at the time of disposal 
and local regulations and/or capabilities (e.g., landfill or incinerator), thus making them 
only quantifiable when location and corresponding environmental regulations are known. 
Disposal costs, if not conducted organically by the U.S. military, depend on host-nation 
disposal fees. If CCSF material is organically disposed of, costs associated with the 
operation of the incinerator represent the disposal costs. Such costs may be irrelevant if 
the existing CCSF structures are turned over to host-nation representatives for future use. 
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The semipermanent nature of the CCSF insulated tents also incurs costs 
associated with deconstruction. Costs such as additional labor and equipment (i.e., front 
loaders, cutting equipment, dump trucks, etc.) are required for their disassembly and 
removal if conducted by nonorganic, nonmilitary sources, such as government-contracted 
companies or host-nation personnel. 
b. Construction Time/Design Modifications 
CCSF insulation requires dedicated substrate preparation, application, and cure 
time, depending on the desired insulating properties of the end product. Application times 
vary depending on the structure size and the desired foam thickness, which is driven by 
R-value requirements. Additional temporary structures are required for personnel 
berthing during CCSF application, due to a minimum 24-hour wait time required prior to 
structure occupancy. The additional structure requirement increases inventory and 
maintenance costs associated with CCSF implementation. 
Traditional tent structures also require modification prior to CCSF application. 
When cured, the foam’s rigidity prevents the use of the tent’s standard egress doors. As 
such, two wooden vestibules with traditional doorways are installed prior to foam 
application to meet military fire safety standards, which increases construction costs. 
Specific structure modification costs depend on the materials used (e.g., vestibule and 
door materials) and the type of tent structure employed. Due to the different materials 
required by each type of structure, and various sourcing options of those materials in 
forward-deployed locations, definitive cost numbers are unavailable. 
c. Structure Mobility 
Traditional military tents are designed to be erected and disassembled in a  
24-hour period, yielding a highly mobile and temporary structure. Because CCSF 
insulation bonds to the substrate to which it is applied (i.e., the outer tent lining), foamed 
tents become semipermanent once constructed and the outer tent lining becomes unusable 
for future use. Units may require a reserve of spare tents to maintain mobility 
requirements in the event that operations dictate relocation to an area without established, 
suitable berthing and operating structures. The requirement for redundant structures 
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increases the inventory and holding costs associated with the increase in the  
unit’s MTOE. 
d. Implementation Costs – Safety, Training, and Doctrine 
Safety: CCSF creates inherent safety hazards for the end user that must be 
considered. After the application, all exterior panels of the tent structure become rigid 
making fire safety, egress, and air quality and inspection requirements similar to those of 
a permanent-type structure. This requires DOD components to implement safety 
standards and training measures to mitigate the additional risk, while ensuring 
compliance with structure occupancy regulations and standards. DOD components 
utilizing CCSF structures must incorporate safety and health quality measures that meet 
minimum standards, as outlined in the applicable Safety of Use Messages (SOUM)  
(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [USACE], 2010). Additionally, SOUMs require that 
quarterly, or force turnover, inspections are conducted and records maintained for two 
years; but, it does not stipulate the required qualifications of inspecting personnel. 
Additional personnel requirements to inspect compliance with published standards may 
incur additional costs associated with CCSF implementation. While SOUMs provide 
general guidance regarding safety, air quality, inspection, and record-keeping 
requirements, several variables present difficulties in quantifying the costs associated 
with safety standards implementation and training. 
Monitoring: The EPA and OSHA have clearly identified health concerns 
associated with CCSF application, primarily focused on component chemical exposure 
and reentry periods after the application. While there are laws, rules, and regulations in 
place to address health concerns associated with CCSF exposure, long-term exposure 
health impacts have yet to be determined. These variables prohibit determining the costs 
associated with long-term monitoring for health and safety. 
Use Training: Individual DOD components will be required to develop 
appropriate training in compliance with the policy governing CCSF use. A reasonable 
expectation would be to utilize online training venues such as Navy Knowledge Online 
and Army Knowledge Online, in the same manner that personnel are required to 
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complete annual general military training (GMT) and predeployment training 
requirements. Until official policy is established incorporating CCSF as part of the 
DOD’s energy policy, the costs associated with additional training are difficult  
to quantify. 
e. Opportunity Costs 
Decreased budget flexibility for operational commanders represents a major 
opportunity cost if policy directs CCSF implementation in forward-deployed locations. 
Foam application to forward-deployed structures requires upfront costs that reduce fiscal 
resources from other mission-related expenditures. CCSF opportunity cost may increase, 
as DOD budgets decrease, forcing commanders to make trade-offs. 
Despite the fact that CCSF implementation reduces total fuel expenditures, 
financial resources saved may not be reprogrammable due to congressional 
appropriations and authorization constraints (i.e., the “color of money”). DESC purchases 
fuel for the DOD under separate budget appropriations; therefore, saved financial 
resources may not be reallocated to operational DOD budgets or be recouped by the 
operational commanders implementing CCSF insulation. Additionally, this may deter 
upfront investment in CCSF implementation. Without increased funding for CCSF usage, 
operational commanders are required to weigh the opportunity costs based on mission 
needs, and not the overall benefits from CCSF. 
Opportunity costs also exist beyond the financial affect. In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, host-nation contractors regularly provide labor forces to build 
semipermanent berthing structures for deployed forces, creating jobs for the local 
populace, which injects money into the local economy. Host-nation contractor 
employment builds goodwill and support for U.S. troops with local communities. If 
CCSF installation is U.S.-contractor sourced, it may reduce the need for host-nation 
support and affect goodwill and overall host-nation support of U.S. activities. Removal of 
certain host-nation support may impact the effectiveness of U.S. military objectives in the 
localized AORs. This lost opportunity cost may escalate wherever U.S. presence is a 
divisive issue within the host-nation populations. 
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F. STEP 5: IDENTIFY AND ESTIMATE QUANTIFIABLE AND 
NONQUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS 
This section examines the quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits associated 
with the alternative course of action—the application of CCSF insulation to the three tent 
structures. Market valuation methods are used to determine quantifiable financial 
benefits. Examples of quantifiable financial benefits include cost savings and/or 
avoidance, and productivity improvements. Nonquantifiable benefits are those that 
cannot be captured numerically, but provide an overall identifiable benefit as a result of 
the chosen course of action. 
1. Quantifiable Benefits 
Quantifiable benefits associated with CCSF implementation include the financial 
saving realized from the reduction in fuel use, transportation, and storage, and the reduction 
in required generator quantities and  sizes. These benefits can be measured in financial terms 
and projected over that anticipated duration of CCSF use and employment on the battlefield.  
a. Fuel Savings 
Reduced fuel use is the major quantifiable benefit realized by the application of 
CCSF insulation. Increased R-values provided by CCSF reduces energy loads associated 
with the ECUs necessary to maintain internal temperatures and air-flow requirements of the 
respective tent structures. Table 11 summarizes the average annual fuel consumption of the 
three respective tents without CCSF insulation and the annual fuel costs dependent on the 
price per gallon of fuel. Annual fuel consumption in gallons is 10,573, 10,600, and 14,488 
for frame tents, GP-M tents, and GP-L tents, respectively (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 






of $3.70/gal  
JP-8 
FBCF Price (Low 
End) of $16.00/gal 
JP-8 
FBCF Price (High 
End) of $34.90/gal 
JP-8 
Frame Tent 10,573 $39,120 $169,168 $368,997 
GP-M 10,600 $39,220 $169,600 $369,940 
GP-L 14,488 $53,606 $231,808 $505,631 
Table 11.   Annual fuel consumption cost per tent 
(after Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
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The standard price of JP-8 was retrieved from the FY2015 DESC website, 
http://www.energy.dla.mil/customers/standard_prices/Pages/default.aspx, under “DLA 
Energy Standard Prices.” This price is the standard price charged to DOD customers 
regardless of the transportation requirements and costs to the end user. 
The low-end FBCF price of $13.80 (2008BY$) was derived from the AMSAA 
Study (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). The adjustment for inflation from 2008 to 2014 BY 
dollars was calculated using the JIC from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis. The 
calculation utilized the drop-down category “Fuel for all services (OSD Cost Element),” 
yielding an inflation factor of 1.1619. The FBFC equaled $16.00 in 2014 BY dollars. 
The high-end FBCF price was also derived from the AMSAA study, which 
recommended an FBCF range from $10.00 to $30.00 (2008BY$) (Foulkner & Wilke, 
2010). This analysis used the $30.00 FBCF price as the high-end fuel cost. The 
adjustment for inflation from 2008 to 2014 BY dollars was also calculated using the JIC 
from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis. The calculation utilized the drop-down category 
“Fuel for all services (OSD Cost Element),” yielding an inflation factor of 1.1619. The 
FBFC equaled $34.90 in 2014 BY dollars. 
Table 12 compares the average annual fuel consumption of the three tent 
structures prior to and after CCSF application. CCSF insulation resulted in an average 
fuel consumption savings of approximately 59.25% from the uninsulated structures. 
Assuming that fuel is transported in 5,000-gallon tankers, the annual fuel savings from a 
single-frame, or GP-M, tent equates to the removal of one fuel truck from resupply 
convoys annually, and two for a GP-L tent. Fuel truck removal corresponds to the 
number of convoys required to support combat operations in forward-deployed locations. 
Annual Average Fuel Savings per Tent (Iraq and Afghanistan) 
 






Fuel Consumption Savings 
(gal) 
Frame Tent 10,573 4,652 5,921 (56%) 
GP-M 10,600 4,664 5,936 (56%) 
GP-L 14,488 5,215 9,272 (64%) 
Table 12.   Average fuel consumption change due to foam application 
(after Foulkner & Wilke, 2010). 
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Fuel consumption savings, in 2014 BY dollars, are directly related to the price of 
fuel. Annual fuel savings from CCSF-insulated tents ranged from approximately $22,000 
to $35,500 dollars per structure, using the 2014 standard price of JP-8 (see Table 13). The 
DOD uses the standard price of fuel during budget formulation; therefore, these savings 
will directly affect the budgeted line items associated with fuel cost and consumption. 
When using the FBCF price, which includes all costs associated with delivery to the end 
user, the savings translate to those realized by the operational commanders in forward-
deployed locations. 






of $3.70/gal  
JP-8 
FBCF Price  
(Low End) of 
$16.00/gal JP-8 
FBCF Price  
(High End) of 
$34.90/gal JP-8 
Frame Tent 5,921 $21,907 $94,736 $206,643 
GP-M 5,936 $21,963 $94,976 $207,166 
GP-L 9,272 $35,416 $148,352 $323,593 
Table 13.   Annual cost savings per foamed tent (after Foulkner & Wilke, 
2010). 
2. Net Present Value 
NPV represents the current value of money saved, as a result of fuel savings, over 
the assumed useful lives of the tent structures. Expected useful life and deployment 
durations of the tent structures are assumed to be between three and seven years. In 
accordance with the published 2014 Discount Rates for OMB Circular No. A-94, –0.03% 
three-year and 0.0% five-year discount rates were used to calculate NPVs for the three- 
and five-year employment durations. In this calculation, “cash flow” represents the 
annual fuel cost savings, depending on the fuel price (e.g., standard price, FBCF low end, 
and FBCF high-end). 
NPV (annuity) = (CF/r) * (1- (1/(1+r)t) – initial foam application cost 
NPV = Net present value (2014BY$) 
CF = Cash flow (fuel savings in dollars) (BY$) 
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r = Discount rate 
t = Time period in years 
Table 14 shows the net present value of savings per structure over a three-year 
period. Three-year useful life is chosen to represent the low-end expected use of foamed 
tents in forward-deployed locations. Using the FY 2014 standard price of JP-8, NPV 
savings ranged from $54,008 to $86,215, per structure, over a three-year period. From an 
operational standpoint, the NPV savings realized by using the high-end FBCF resulted in 
a savings ranging from $611,556 to $959,307, per structure, over a three-year period. 
























Frame Tent 5,921 $12,111 $54,008 $273,811 $611,556 
GP-M 5,936 $12,443 $53,844 $274,203 $612,804 
GP-L 9,272 $17325 $86,215 $430,415 $959,307 
Table 14.   NPV of fuel savings per foamed tent (over a three-year period). 
Table 15 shows the net present value of savings per structure over a five-year 
period. Five-year useful life is chosen to represent the average expected use of foamed 
tents in forward-deployed locations. Using the FY 2014 standard price of JP-8, NPV 
savings ranged from $97,428 to $154,207, per structure, over a five-year period. From an 
operational standpoint, the NPV savings realized by using the high-end FBCF resulted in 
a savings ranging from $1,021,104 to $1,600,639, per structure, over a five-year period 
  
  59 























JP-8 (high end) 
Frame Tent 5,921 $12,111 $97,428 $461,569 $1,021,104 
GP-M 5,936 $12,443 $97,373 $462,437 $1,023,389 
GP-L 9,272 $17325 $154,207 $724,435 $1,600,639 
Table 15.   NPV of fuel savings per foamed tent (over a five-year period). 
a. Fuel Delivery Reduction and Associated Fuel Savings 
Fuel-demand reduction resulting from CCSF will reduce fuel truck deliveries 
needed to sustain operations. Historically, 2,500-gallon- and 5,000-gallon-capacity fuel 
trucks are used to transport fuel to various locations throughout the battlefield. This 
analysis looked at two types of commonly used U.S. Army fuel trucks: the M978 A4 
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) and the Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement (MTVR) Mk 31, a seven-ton tractor truck with a fuel tank (see Figures 15 
and 16). Table 16 summarizes the vehicles’ characteristics and unit costs. 
 
Figure 15.  M978 A4 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT); a  
2,500-gallon tanker (from Basic Concepts Inc., 2015). 
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Figure 16.  Oshkosh Wheeled Tanker (Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 
Mk 31 7-Ton Tractor Truck with Tank) (from Military-Today.com, 2015). 







M978 A4 (HEMTT) 2320-01-097-02490 $396,130 300 miles ~2 
MK 31 (MTVR) 2320-01-552-2762 $181,000 300 miles ~3.8 
MTVR 5,000-gal fuel trailer 2330-01-155-0048 $90,610 None None 
Table 16.   U.S. Army Fuel Truck Characteristics 
(after Cooke, 2008; after Jean, 2011).  
Table 17 summarizes the annual fuel truck reduction per structure from the 
application of CCSF insulation. To demonstrate the potential effect of CCSF insulation 
on fuel-truck reduction, the living requirements of a standard deployed combat unit, a 
U.S. Army infantry company, were analyzed. Maximum personnel occupancy per tent 
was determined using the CENTCOM “Sand Book,” which dictates a minimum berthing 
requirement of 80 square feet per soldier in the CENTCOM AOR. Assuming that a 
typical U.S. Army infantry company is comprised of 100 personnel, nine GP-L tents are 
required for berthing. CCSF application to the nine tents reduces fuel consumption by 
16.65 (9 x 1.85) 5,000-gallon fuel trucks or 33.4 (9 x 3.71) 2,500-gallon fuel  
deliveries annually. 
  61 
Individual Structure Annual Fuel-Truck Reduction from CCSF Insulation 
 Fuel Consumption Savings (gal) 
# of 2,500-gal Fuel 
Deliveries Reduced  
(i.e., HEMTT) 
# of 5,000-gal Fuel 
Deliveries Reduced  
(i.e., MTVR) 
Frame Tent 5,921 2.37 1.18 
GP-M 5,936 2.37 1.19 
GP-L 9,272 3.71 1.85 
Table 17.   Individual structure annual fuel-truck reduction from CCSF 
insulation. 
The decrease in fuel deliveries translates to fewer miles traveled and less fuel 
required for fuel-transporting assets (i.e., fuel trucks). The savings depends on the type of 
structures used, number of structures employed, miles traveled to FOB locations, and 
miles per gallon of the transporting asset. Based on an average, 300-mile, normal 
operating range of the MTVR and HEMTT, maximum one-way travel distance was 
limited to 120 miles during the analysis, while reserving 20%, or 60 gallons, to account 
for unexpected travel and/or combat circumstances. Tables 18 and 19 show the 
approximate fuel savings from reduced fuel deliveries, depending on the transportation 
asset, a maximum distance from the origin of 120 miles, and a JP-8 standard price of 
$3.70 (FY 2014) per gallon. 


























Frame Tent 2.37 240 568.8 145.8 $540 $5,090 
GP-M 2.37 240 568.8 145.8 $540 $5,090 
GP-L 3.71 240 890.4 228.3 $845 $7,968 
Table 18.   Estimated annual cost savings from fuel-delivery reduction 
(2014BY$) – HEMTT. 
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Frame Tent 1.18 240 283.2 141.6 $524 $4,942 
GP-M 1.19 240 285.6 142.8 $528 $4,984 
GP-L 1.85 240 444 222 $821 $7,748 
Table 19.   Estimated annual cost savings from fuel-delivery reduction 
(2014BY$) – MTVR. 
b. Generator Reduction/Right Sizing 
Generator sets are the largest fuel consumers at forward-deployed locations, with 
ECUs drawing the largest energy demand. As a result, ECU reduction leads to load and 
power reduction. Generator fuel inefficiencies arise from numerous variables that include 
varying demand loads, under-loading, overloading, number of start-ups, operating 
altitudes, ambient temperatures, and fuel type. Under-loaded generators run inefficiently; 
therefore, matching the generator set size to the expected load is necessary to maximize 
fuel efficiencies. Additionally, higher load demands require larger generator sets, which 
increase associated fuel costs and generator procurement costs. 
Reduced energy demand resulting from ECU reduction enables localized power 
grids to operate with fewer and smaller generators at optimal load levels. Reduction in 
generator size and amounts has additional cost savings related to their operation, 
maintenance, and transportation requirements. 
Based on performance data from Iraq and Afghanistan, the AMSAA analyzed 
energy loads required by the three foamed and unfoamed structures, and calculated that 
the fuel consumption rates for “10kW, 15kW, 30kW, 60kW, 100kW, and 200kW sized 
tactical quiet generators” (Foulkner & Wilke, 2010, p. 15). Generator size requirements 
per structure are determined from the maximum electrical demand in kilowatts (kW), 
accounting for mission and start-up loads, as seen in Table 20 (Foulkner & Wilke, 2009). 
CCSF application reduced the size of the generators required to power the respective tent 
structures. For example, a single, unfoamed frame tent requires one 30kW generator, 
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based on the maximum load of 22.6kW. The comparable foamed frame tent only requires 
a 10kW generator, based on a maximum load of 4.3kW, as a result of reduced ECU 
power demand. The decrease in ECU power demand equates to smaller generators 
required to power berthing structures. 
Structure 
Type 
Average Unfoamed Generator 
Set Requirements 
Average Foamed Generator Set 
Requirements 








kW Generator Set 
Frame Tent 22.6 6.7 30kW 4.3 3.0 10kW 
GP-M 23.0 6.8 30kW 4.4 3.1 10kW 
GP-L 32.1 9.3 60kW 6.0 4.1 10kW 
Table 20.   Tent generator size requirements (after Foulkner & Wilke, 2009). 
In addition to smaller generator size, CCSF application reduced the quantity of 
generators required to power berthing structures. Table 21 shows the quantity of generators 
required to power the unfoamed and foamed tent structures. Based on maximum-kW, an 
unfoamed frame tent requires 2.26 10kW generators to provide adequate power, compared 
to its foamed counterpart that only requires 0.43 10kW generators. As the example shows, 
one 10kW generator can support the electrical demand of two foamed frame tents, 
compared to its single, unfoamed counterpart, which requires a minimum of one 30kW 
generator. CCSF application allows for either the reduction in generator size or an increase 
in the number of tent structures supported by an individual generator. 
Structure Type Generator Set Requirements – Unfoamed 
Generator Set Requirements – 
Foamed 
 Maximum kW 10kW 30kW 60kW 
Maximum 
kW 10kW 30kW 60kW 
Frame Tent 22.6 2.26 0.75 0.38 4.3 0.43 0.14 0.07 
GP-M 23.0 2.30 0.77 0.38 4.4 0.44 0.15 0.07 
GP-L 32.1 3.21 1.07 0.54 6.0 0.60 0.20 0.10 
Table 21.   Tent generator requirements (after Foulkner & Wilke, 2009). 
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The reduction in both generator size and generator quantity equates to greater 
generator configuration options and a reduction in overall procurement costs. Table 22 
shows the procurement costs (2015FY$) of 10kW, 30kW, and 60kW Tactical Quiet 
Generator sets from the DLIS website. 
Generator Set Generator Set Cost (2015FY$) 
 NSN Cost 
10kW 6115-00-033-1389 $12,102 
30kW 6115-01-462-0290 $24,334 
60kW 6115-01-274-7390 $25,073 
Table 22.   Generator set procurement costs (after DLA, 2015). 
To show cost savings from generator reductions, the berthing requirements of a 
standard deployed combat unit, a U.S. Army infantry company comprised of 
approximately 100 personnel, was chosen again. Table 23 shows the maximum load 
demanded by the required nine GP-L tents in kW. The number of 10kW, 30kW, and 
60kW generators required to power both the unfoamed and foamed tents were calculated 
by dividing the maximum kW by the generator size in kW. The number of generators 
required was then multiplied by the respective generator procurement costs to arrive at a 
total generator cost to power the nine tents. For the unfoamed tents, the most economical 
quantity and size of generators equaled five 60kW generators costing $125,365 
(2015FY$). For the foamed tents, one 60kW generator, costing $25,073 (2015FY$), is 
capable of meeting the reduced energy demand of the nine tents due to CCSF application. 
This example shows the cost savings that CCSF insulation has on generator 
configurations needed to support berthing structures. 
























GP-L 288.9 28.89 9.63 4.82 54.0 5.40 1.80 0.90 
Generator Cost   $349,627 $234,336 $120,726   $65,351 $43,801 $22,566 
GP-L (rounded) 288.9 29 10 5 54.0 6 2 1 
Generator Cost   $349,627 $243,340 $125,365   $72,612 $48,668 $25,073 
Table 23.   Generator configuration and procurement costs for nine GP-L 
tents. 
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3. Nonquantifiable Benefits 
Nonquantifiable benefits associated with CCSF implementation are those that 
cannot be represented in financial terms and depend on the situational employment of 
CCSF insulation. They include increased quality of life and morale for combat personnel, 
increased structure physical protection characteristics, reduced fuel transportation asset 
requirements, reduced convoy operations, and reduced convoy-related casualties. 
Identifying and considering these nonquantifiable benefits during the decision-making 
process enables leadership to determine the best course of action that will satisfy their 
operational requirements or goals. 
a. Quality of Life/Morale 
Quality of life increases overall morale for deployed units and provides important 
benefits to commanders. Deployed personnel are exposed to battlefield stress stemming 
from mission hazards, separation from family, and lack of sleep. CCSF provides a vast 
improvement in the quality of life for deployed personnel through improved air quality, 
temperature control, and noise reduction. 
Typical military GP tents provide limited protection to personnel from 
environmental elements such as wind, rain, dust, and drastic temperature variation. CCSF 
application minimizes the penetration of airborne particulates and hazards, thus 
increasing the overall air quality inside the structure. Improved indoor air quality gives 
deployed military commanders personnel that are rested and less susceptible to adverse 
health risks. 
While forward-deployed structures utilize ECUs to control internal temperatures, 
military tents struggle to maintain stable interior temperatures. In extreme heat or cold, 
ECUs operate at capacity to maintain livable environments. CCSF application enables 
efficient ECU operation, temperature regulation, and stability for the structures’ 
inhabitants, thereby significantly improving the quality of life for deployed personnel. 
Ambient noise can be a major inhibitor to personnel sleep cycles in deployed 
environments. Current military tent structures provide very little to no protection from 
ambient noise. CCSF insulation provides a barrier from ambient noise, limiting 
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disruption of rest and recovery periods. Increased sleep and rest is a significant quality of 
life improvement, resulting in more combat-effective and ready personnel. 
b. Structure Protection (Ballistic) 
The increasing casualty rates suffered by U.S. personnel during the early years of 
the Iraq campaign resulted in the acquisition of various personnel protective technologies. 
While the focus of this research project is on energy savings related to CCSF, this 
product offers additional benefits related to ballistic protection, as described in  
Chapter II. 
Honeywell International, Inc. has developed, and is currently seeking patent 
protection for, several blast mitigation and suppression systems that incorporate the use 
of TERRAStrong II spray polyurethane foam the trademarked product owned by 
Honeywell and used during the 2008 Iraq EITS contract. The CCSF product is described 
in the patent application as a material that helps dissipate the effects of explosive blast 
waves when applied to the undercarriage of armored vehicles. Possible CCSF blast 
mitigation properties warrant further research as to how they would apply to forward-
deployed berthing structures. 
c. Reduced Fuel Truck Inventories and Associated Life-Cycle Costs 
Reduction in fuel consumption to support base activities may reduce the inventory 
of fuel trucks required in forward-deployed locations. Additionally, CCSF application 
may also reduce the required number of fuel trucks carried in the current DOD inventory. 
Less fuel consumption translates to fewer assets required. The reduction in the DOD fuel 
truck inventory will decrease the costs associated with vehicle storage, operation, 
transportation, maintenance, and future replacement costs (i.e., life-cycle costs). 
d. Convoy Reduction 
CCSF application reduces the amount and size of fuel convoys necessary to 
support base activities, thereby reducing the overall costs of convoy operations. Fuel 
convoy costs include purchase, operation, and maintenance of the transportation assets, 
protection assets (personnel and combat equipment), and personnel required to support 
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and coordinate the movements. Many of these costs are only quantifiable when  
mission-specific details are identified. Some examples of benefits relating to convoy 
reduction are: 
• Reduced asset base required to conduct convoys (i.e., fuel trucks, 
maintenance, deprecation, replacement, etc.). 
• Reduced manpower associated with convoy planning, coordination,  
and control. 
• Reduction of soft targets on the battlefield (i.e., targets of opportunity). 
• Reduced risk to military personnel and mission. 
• Reduced reliance on contracted support (i.e., contracted vehicles  
and drivers). 
• Reduced security assets and personnel tasked with convoy security. 
e. Convoy Personnel Casualty Reduction 
Casualties resulting from attacks on fuel convoys are related to the frequency of 
convoys conducted within a battlespace. According to the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL), “resupply casualties have historically accounted for about 10–12% of 
total Army casualties—the majority related to fuel and water transport” (Siegel, Bell, 
Dicke & Arbuckle, 2008, p. 9). The reduction of a single fuel convoy reduces the number 
of casualties associated with fuel use and its transportation to various outstations or 
FOBs. Although convoy casualties can be calculated based on historical data, it is 
difficult to predict convoy casualties associated with future operations. Such casualties 
depend on the nature of conflict, projected operating environment (permissive versus 
nonpermissive), distance traveled, levels of security assigned, and seasonal factors (i.e., 
weather, daylight duration, etc.). 
In 2009, the AEPI conducted a study of historical casualty data from 2003 through 
2007 to determine the casualty factors associated with fuel and water supply convoys (see 
Figure 17). Casualty factors were calculated using field data from convoy attacks and their 
resulting casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. The analysis concluded that every fuel convoy 
removed from the road reduces the possible wartime casualties by 0.042 personnel in 
Afghanistan and 0.026 personnel in Iraq (see Table 24) (Siegel et al., 2008). 
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Figure 17.  Resupply casualties by theater and year (from Siegel et al., 2008). 
 
Table 24.   Casualty factors Iraq and Afghanistan (2007) 
(from Siegel et al., 2008). 
Situational variables surrounding convoy operations prevent the derivation of 
accurate quantifiable financial benefits resulting from convoy reduction. Further 
complicating the issue is the large variation in published fiscal estimations of the value of 
lives lost in combat. Despite the challenges to accurately capturing the financial benefits from 
loss of life, a rudimentary example can be made to show the generic effect that convoy 
reduction has on fuel convoy casualties. Since FOB sizes vary throughout the battlefield, a 
FOB located in Iraq consisting of 300 personnel (approximately three U.S. Army infantry 
companies) was chosen to demonstrate the possible effects of CCSF. Tent requirements were 
also calculated using the 80-square-foot-per-soldier requirement dictated by the CENTCOM 
“Sand Book.” The GP-L was again chosen as the preferred berthing structure to keep the 
analysis consistent with previous examples used during this CBA. Dividing the internal 
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footprint of a GP-L (999 square feet) by the 80-square-foot-per-soldier requirement equated 
to a maximum occupancy of 12 personnel per tent. Twenty-five GP-L tents are required to 
satisfy the berthing requirements of the 300 FOB personnel. 
Casualty numbers were determined by first calculating the annual fuel 
consumption of the 25 GP-L tents with and without CCSF. To determine the number of 
trucks required for fuel transport, the annual fuel consumption of the 25 tents was divided 
by 5,000 gallons, the capacity of a standard U.S. Army fuel truck. Using a worst-case 
scenario, it was assumed that each 5,000-gallon fuel truck requires its own convoy. 
Casualty numbers were determined by multiplying the number of convoys by the Iraq 
convoy casualty factor of 0.026 (from Table 24). From the above example, CCSF 
application results in a fuel convoy casualty reduction from 1.9 personnel for unfoamed 
structures to 0.7 personnel for foamed structures; a 63% casualty reduction. Tables 25 
and 26 show the annual fuel convoy casualty numbers for the three tent structures 
(unfoamed and foamed), based on the calculations in the example above: 
 
Estimated Annual Fuel Convoy Casualties (without CCSF) 
Tent Type 
(each) 

















Frame Tent 38 10,573 401,774 80 80 2.1 
GP-M 38 10,600 402,800 80 80 2.1 
GP-L 25 14,488 362,200 72 72 1.9 
Table 25.   Estimated annual fuel convoy casualties, based on a 300-person 
unit  (without CCSF). 
Estimated Annual Fuel Convoy Casualties (with CCSF) 
Tent Type 
(each) 

















Frame Tent 38 4,652 176,776 35 35 0.9 
GP-M 38 4,664 177,232 35 36 0.9 
GP-L 25 5,215 130,375 26 26 0.7 
Table 26.   Estimated annual fuel convoy casualties, based on a 300-person 
unit  (with CCSF). 
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To provide a theater-wide example, the AEPI determined that, in 2007, 
502,110,368 gallons of fuel was transported in Iraq to support combat operations (Eady, 
Siegel, Bell & Dicke, 2009). Of the total fuel transported, generators consumed 
approximately 65% or 326,371,739 gallons (502,110,368 gal. x 0.65) (AFCESA, 2010). 
Of the total fuel consumed by generators, approximately “80%” of fuel is used to power 
ECUs (AFCESA, 2010, p. 5), or 261,097,391 gallons (326,371,739 gal. x 8). AEPI 
calculated that the average fuel-carrying capacity of a convoy in Iraq in 2007 was 
approximately 97,818 gallons (16 trucks) (Eady et al., 2009), equating to 2,670 convoys 
(261,097,391 gal./97,818 gal./convoy) required to supply fuel solely to power ECUs. 
Using the casualty factor of 0.026 for fuel resupply convoys in Iraq, 69.42 casualties 
(2,670 convoys x 0.026) resulted from transporting fuel to power ECUs. 
To show CCSF insulation’s effect on casualty reduction, the fuel used to power 
ECUs in the previous example is cut by 56%; the approximate average fuel savings 
realized by CCSF application to the three structures analyzed. This calculation assumes 
that all structures running ECUs equate to the same reduction in fuel consumption as the 
three tent structures analyzed during this study. The resulting total fuel consumption used 
to power ECUs was reduced to 114,882,852 (261,097,391 gal. x 0.56) gallons, requiring 
1,175 fuel convoys (114,882,852 gal./97,818 gal./convoy). Using the casualty factor of 
0.026 for fuel resupply convoys in Iraq, 30.54 casualties (1,175 convoys x 0.026) are 
attributed to fuel transportation to power ECUs. In this example, CCSF application 
resulted in a 56% reduction in casualties associated with fuel convoys. 
Available published data regarding the Value(s) of a Statistical Life (VSL) vary. 
In 1993, Kip Viscus, from Duke University, estimated the VSL to be approximately 
$7,500,000 (Viscusi, 1993). In 2010, The U.S. Food and Drug Administration estimated 
the value of a life to be approximately $7,900,000 (Appelbaum, 2011). During the  
Bush Administration, the EPA published estimates ranging from $6,800,000 to 
$9,100,000 (Appelbaum, 2011). In 2014, the U.S. Department of Transportation provided 
their value of a life estimate of approximately $9,200,000 (U.S. Department of 
Transportation [DOT], 2014). Although various U.S. government agencies publish VSL 
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estimates, the DOD refrains from publically assigning and publicizing dollar amounts to 
soldier’s lives due to the sensitivity of the issue. 
As the above data suggests, accurately determining the VSL is both complex and 
varying, depending on the factors involved in calculating a VSL. To show the 
hypothetical cost savings from convoy casualty reduction, the above estimates were used 
as the data set yielding a low-end estimate of $6,800,000, a high-end estimate of 
$9,200,000, and a mean VSL of $8,100,000. These estimates were used to calculate 
possible cost savings in human life, based on casualty reductions from CCSF 
implementation. Table 27 summarizes the possible cost savings resulting from casualty 
reduction using the above using 2007 Iraq fuel consumption and casualty factor data. 
 
Casualty Cost Savings 
 Casualty Numbers Low-End Cost Mean Cost High-End Cost Without CCSF 69.42 $472,056,000 $562,302,000 $638,664,000 
With CCSF 30.54 $207,672,000 $247,374,000 $280,968,000 
Total Savings 38.88 $264,384,000 $314,928,000 $357,696,000 
Table 27.   Casualty cost savings. 
G. STEP 6: DEFINE ALTERNATIVE SELECTION CRITERIA 
 This step identifies and describes the alternative selection criteria for the  
decision-making process. The chosen alternative selection is based on the assumed 
importance factors of a geographic combatant commander or joint force commander in 
forward-deployed combat zones. Selection criteria include both financial and 
nonfinancial factors, tailored to the problem statement, as they relate to the two courses 
of action: the status quo and the alternative. 
1. Financial Selection Criteria 
ROI, NPV, and BEP were chosen as financial selection criteria for this analysis 
due to their ability to capture the financial benefits from CCSF implementation. All three 
financial measures analyze the financial benefits over varying time durations, fluctuations 
in material and fuel prices, and changes in discount rates dictated by the Office of 
Management and Budget.  
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a. Return on Investment 
For this analysis, ROI is the amount saved in fuel costs in relation to the initial 
CCSF material expenditures per tent structure over a one-year period. ROI is dependent 
on commodity and material prices, as well as the geographic location in which the 
structure is employed. Volatility in global fuel prices will either increase or decrease the 
ROI, depending on the direction of the price fluctuation. Foam material prices will vary 
depending on the size and scope of the contract, contractor capabilities, and CCSF 
component material price. Employment location also factors into ROI as it drives energy 
efficiency, fuel consumption levels, and material amounts needed to satisfy specific R-
value insulating requirements. Fuel consumption is expected to increase in locations 
experiencing large temperature variations, compared to those with static climates. 
b. Net Present Value 
NPV calculations represent the present value of the annual savings in fuel costs 
from CCSF application. NPV provides an upfront estimation of future dollars saved used 
to compare initial investment decisions. Additionally, it provides savings values for 
varying durations, based on the expected useful life of the foamed structures and the 
anticipated duration of structure employment. 
c. Breakeven Period 
 The BEP is the duration of time required for the initial investment in CCSF to 
match the savings in fuel costs resulting from CCSF application. This BEP enables 
decision makers to identify the minimum time required for CCSF application to yield 
financial benefits, based on the structure’s anticipated employment and use time horizon. 
Similar to ROI, breakeven periods are subject to the same sensitivities inherent in fuel 
and CCSF material prices at the time of implementation. 
2. Nonfinancial Selection Criteria 
Nonfinancial selection criteria used during this analysis include combat 
effectiveness, unit mobility, ease of CCSF integration and use, ease of CCSF disposal, 
and fuel dependence. These criteria are assessed to be of critical importance to combatant 
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and operational commanders when making decisions regarding CCSF implementation on 
the battlefield and for future forward-deployed combat operations.   
a. Combat Effectiveness 
Combat effectiveness includes factors associated with increases in quality of life, 
health and safety, structural benefits, and convoy reduction. The combat effectiveness of 
CCSF implementation, or that of any employed weapon system, is a major consideration 
of any geographic combatant or joint force commander during course of action selection. 
The combat effectiveness selection criteria is broken down into its integral parts during 
the alternative comparison step, yielding an overall combat effectiveness based on the 
weights that the decision maker assigns to its various components relating to his/her 
specific needs. Assuming typical battlefield berthing requirements, CCSF implementation 
provides overall benefits to combat effectiveness. 
b. Mobility 
The semipermanent properties of CCSF-insulated berthing structures require 
consideration when selecting the appropriate course of action. CCSF-insulated structures 
provide favorable benefits in conditions not requiring relocation of equipment or 
personnel, but are detrimental when mobility is required for mission execution. CCSF 
should be implemented when a location’s (i.e., the FOB) employment duration can be 
accurately determined. The status quo, or the unfoamed structure, is more beneficial 
when mobility is required. 
c. Ease of Implementation/Integration 
CCSF implementation and integration into existing DOD construction practices 
requires additional personnel, training, coordination, and costs compared to the 
employment and use of unfoamed tents. This criterion takes into account the 
ability/feasibility of the decision maker to commit the additional resources (i.e., time and 
money) required for CCSF implementation. Implementation and integration into existing 
construction practices requires directing policy in addition to personnel training in 
regards to the construction, use, and maintenance associated with CCSF-insulated tents. 
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The status quo, or the unfoamed tent, is more beneficial when ease of integration is 
required or desired. 
d. Disposal 
Disposal costs associated with CCSF insulated structures are dependent on 
employment location and host-nation environmental regulations. Upfront disposal costs 
should be determined prior to CCSF implementation to determine the overall net benefit 
or cost from CCSF use. Besides the costs associated with the material’s disposal, CCSF 
may require nonorganic personnel and equipment support. Assuming that CCSF disposal 
incurs costs and is not turned over to host nation forces, the unfoamed tent is more 
beneficial due to its ability to be redeployed incurring no disposal costs. 
e. Fuel Dependence 
Current U.S. government and DOD initiatives identify goals to reduce weapons 
systems’ dependence on and use of fossil fuels, shifting towards integrating a greater 
amount of renewable energy sources as a percentage of total DOD operational fuel 
consumption. Reduction of fossil fuel use reduces fuel dependence. Remote and  
land-locked combat locations, such as Afghanistan, highlight the logistic and financial 
effects of high fuel consumption, such as increased risk to mission and required 
resources. Additionally, combat location geopolitical pressures and constraints increase 
risks to mission, military personnel, and political objectives when fuel requirements are 
pivotal to operations. 
H. STEP 7: COMPARE ALTERNATIVES 
1. Decision Matrix Design 
The comparison of courses of action is driven by the viewpoints and priorities of 
the decision maker. As such, generic selection criteria, and their related ratings and 
weights, do not provide value added to the decision-making process. This analysis 
provides a decision matrix, tailored to the courses of action, which can be used to aid 
leadership in determining the possible costs and benefits associated with the two courses 
of action. 
  75 
a. Selection Criteria 
Selection criteria are based on the priorities and desired end state of the decision 
maker. Once determined, the selection criteria are broken into measures of performance 
(MOPs) used to determine the financial and nonfinancial benefits of the respective 
courses of action under consideration. The number of selection criteria should be 
minimized to focus on the decision-making process. When applicable, the decision 
matrix should include criteria that are quantifiable, usually financial, and nonquantifiable 
(DoA, 2013). Nonquantifiable selection criteria are subjective in nature and thus require 
consensus among decision makers in regards to their importance. The following list 
shows the selection criteria, MOPs, and their rationale, which are used to evaluate the 
courses of action: 
Financial Selection Criteria 
• 1: Return on Investment – ROI was chosen to measure the efficiency of the 
use of financial resources. The “return” for this ROI calculation is the savings 
from reduced fuel consumption. ROI only applies to the CCSF alternative, but 
depends on its anticipated duration of employment. If ROI is negative, CCSF 
implementation should be rated low. 
• 2: Net Present Value – NPV was chosen to determine the viability or benefit 
of CCSF implementation and associated opportunity costs. Opportunity costs 
represent the other options that the decision maker can dedicate financial 
resources to if CCSF is not implemented. A positive NPV tells the decision 
maker that the financial benefits, in this case savings, outweigh the financial 
costs of CCSF implementation. NPV only applies to the CCSF alternative, but 
depends on its anticipated duration of employment. If NPV is negative, CCSF 
implementation should be  
rated low. 
• 3: Break-Even Period – BEP was chosen to determine the respective time 
period(s) required for CCSF to become cost beneficial. BEP only applies to 
the CCSF alternative, but depends on its anticipated duration of employment. 
Depending on the current cost of fuel and CCSF contract price, decision 
makers can compare the expected BEP with the anticipated duration of a 
military operation to determine if it is cost beneficial to employ CCSF. If the 
BEP is longer than the anticipated duration of employment, CCSF 
implementation should be rated low. 
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Nonfinancial Selection Criteria 
• 1: Combat Effectiveness 
o MOP 1.1: Quality of Life – Soldier effectiveness is directly attributable to his or her 
quality of life outside of combat operations. It includes comfort, cleanliness, and 
factors that influence rest, recovery, and sleep periods that affect soldier stress levels 
and combat performance. 
o MOP 1.2: Health and Safety – This MOP accounts for the health and safety benefits 
provided by the course of action and includes factors such as physical protection from 
environmental or combat conditions that may adversely affect soldier short-term or 
long-term health-related issues. 
o MOP 1.3: Structural Durability – In areas of adverse and varying environmental 
conditions, structural integrity is an essential factor when choosing berthing 
structures. Structural integrity determines structure useful life in forward-deployed 
locations and minimizes replacement and repair costs. 
o MOP 1.4: Convoy Operations – This MOP was chosen to address the 
benefits of casualty reduction associated with reduced convoy operations. If 
convoy operations are assessed to be protected, or operate in a permissive 
environment, this MOP will not vary between the two courses of action due to 
the low risk of convoy-related casualties. 
• 2: Structure Mobility – Structure mobility was chosen to address the course 
of action’s ability to satisfy unit or desired mobility requirements. CCSF 
application reduces the structure’s mobility characteristics and may not be 
feasible for employment under specific battlefield conditions or for units 
requiring mobility. 
• 3: Implementation/Integration – This MOP addresses the course of action’s 
ease of implementation and integration into current military doctrine, training 
curriculums, and operating procedures. 
• 4: Disposal – This MOP addresses the course of action’s ease and expected 
costs of disposal after termination of its useful life or redeployment time. 
Disposal options depend on the host-nation’s willingness to accept custody of 
the structure (i.e., host-nation turnover), or on their environmental regulations. 
• 5: Fuel Dependence – This MOP addresses the course of action’s ability to 
contribute to reduced battlefield fuel consumption. Reduced fuel dependence 
mitigates battlefield risks to mission and personnel. 
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b. Objectives 
Objectives describe the desired end state of the respective MOPs within each 
selection criteria. They are used as a benchmark when assigning ratings to specific 
MOPs. Objectives may vary, depending on the decision maker’s priorities or mission 
criteria. Below are the selection criteria and measure of performance objectives used to 
evaluate the courses of action: 
• Financial Selection Criteria Objectives 
o 1: Return on Investment – A positive ROI over the anticipated period of 
employment (applies only to CCSF alternative) 
o 2: Net Present Value – A positive NPV over the anticipated period of 
employment (applies only to CCSF alternative) 
o 3: Break-Even Period – A breakeven point shorter than the anticipated 
period of employment (applies only to CCSF alternative) 
• Nonfinancial Selection Criteria Objectives 
o   1: Combat Effectiveness 
• MOP 1.1: Quality of Life – Increased quality of life translating to increased 
personnel combat performance. 
• MOP 1.2: Health and Safety – Reduction in health and safety costs, and 
risks to personnel. 
• MOP 1.3: Structural Durability – Increased structural integrity and stability. 
• MOP 1.4: Convoy Operations – Decreased convoy operations, associated 
risks, and costs. 
o       2: Structure Mobility – Relocate the structure within a predetermined 
timeframe. 
o   3: Implementation/Integration – Minimize costs and time associated 
     with implementation into DOD practices. 
• MOP 4: Disposal – Minimize disposal costs associated with structure 
removal. 
• MOP 5: Fuel Dependence – Reduced fuel demand and associated risks and 
costs. 
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c. Ratings 
A rating is the numerical value assigned to selection criteria that identifies the 
course of action’s ability to achieve the criteria’s objective. Rating ranges depend on the 
decision maker’s level of fidelity and/or sensitivity desired. Ratings are subjective for 
both quantifiable and nonquantifiable criteria. For this CBA, a rating range of 1 to 9 is 
used, providing a middle point of 5. A rating of 1 represents a course of action that does 
not, or is unlikely to provide any benefit towards meeting the objective of the specific 
selection criteria. A rating of 9 represents a course of action that is highly likely to, or 
fully meets or exceeds, the objective of the selection criteria. For the decision matrix, a 
rating column is created for each course of action. Below lists the ratings ranges and 
values used to evaluate the courses of action. 
• Rating Range 1–2: Represents a rating that either does not, or is unlikely to, 
achieve the objective of the MOP.  
• Rating Range 3–4: Represents a rating that is may possibly achieve the 
objective of the MOP. 
• Rating 5: Represents the midpoint rating or rating that is likely to achieve the 
objective of the MOP. 
• Rating Range 6–7: Represents a rating that is highly likely to achieve the 
objective of the MOP. 
• Rating Range 8–9: Represents a rating that is near certain or will achieve the 
objective of the MOP. 
c. Weight 
Weight, or weighting, is the numerical value that identifies the level of 
importance of each selection criteria to the decision maker or desired end state. Weights 
for both quantifiable and nonquantifiable selection criteria should individually sum to 
1.00 to maintain an equal effect on the final scoring. Because the weights are required to 
sum to a final value of 1, individual weights must be distributed among the respective 
number of selection criteria, which may vary. Weights display their level of importance 
when compared to the weights assigned to the other selection criteria. For example, a 
weight of 0.4 assigned to MOP 1 represents a selection criterion of higher importance 
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than MOP 2, with a weight of 0.05. As such, there is no defined weighting range that 
corresponds to a specific level of importance (i.e., a weight of 0.4 translates to level of 
“great” importance). Assigning weights are also subjective and depend on the decision 
maker(s) and the desired end state of the courses of action. It is important that weights are 
agreed on by all involved in the decision-making process to ensure continuity when 
assigning values. As such, weighting decisions should be included in the planning 
process when constructing decision matrices. 
d. Weighted Score 
The weighted score for each selection criteria is the multiplication of the criteria’s 
respective rating and weight assigned. Scores for all selection criteria are then added 
together within the same category to produce a final score for the course of action  
(i.e., quantifiable and nonquantifiable). The course of action, or alternative, with the 
highest score provides the most benefit to the desired end state and should be chosen. 
• Weighted Score – Status Quo: The weighted score for each MOP of the 
status quo are added together, resulting in a final score for both financial and 
nonfinancial selection criteria. 
• Weighted Score – CCSF Alternative: The weighted score for each measure 
of performance of the CCSF alternative are added together resulting in a final 
score for both the financial and nonfinancial  
selection criteria. 
The scoring of the two courses of action are based on a hypothetical example of a 
FOB commander in Afghanistan desiring to minimize costs and risk to personnel by 
reducing fuel consumption, while maintaining combat effectiveness. The FOB 
commander is looking to determine if CCSF insulation should be implemented on 
berthing structures required to house an incoming battalion consisting of 1,000 personnel. 
To satisfy the battalion’s berthing requirements, 84 GP-L tents (1,000 personnel divided 
by 12 personnel per GP-L) are required and are part of the battalion’s MTOE. For this 
analysis, combat employment of the incoming battalion is expected to last a minimum of 
one year. Ratings and weights assigned represent the subjective views of the authors of 
this CBA. The following summarizes the results of the assigned ratings and weights 
given to each selection criteria and measures of performance: 
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• The Status Quo Course of Action: The status quo’s financial selection 
criteria yielded a final weighted score of 1 because the course of action does 
not achieve any of the financial objectives and does not provide any financial 
benefit. The status quo’s final financial criteria score of 1 means the course of 
action satisfied approximately 11% of the desired financial selection criteria’s 
objectives. Despite the mathematical score of 11%, this course of action 
actually satisfied 0% of the desired objectives because it does not provide any 
financial benefit. This disparity represents the errors that are inherent in a 
decision matrix and is due to the subjective rating values used in the 
comparison. 
The status quo’s nonfinancial selection criteria yielded a final score of 4.55. This 
course of action ranked above the CCSF alternative in MOPs 2, 3, and 4. The status quo’s 
final score of 4.55 means that the course of action satisfied approximately 51% of the 
desired nonfinancial selection criteria’s objectives (4.55 divided by 9, with 9 representing 
a score that achieves all desired objectives) 
• The CCSF Course of Action: The CCSF’s financial selection criteria yielded 
a final weighted score of 8 due to positive ROI, NPV, and a BEP shorter than 
the expected duration of employment. The CCSF’s financial criteria score of 8 
means that the course of action satisfied 89% of the financial criteria 
objectives (8 divided by 9, with 9 representing a score that achieves all desired 
objectives). 
NPVs were calculated using both the standard price of $3.70/gallon, representing 
a low-end estimate, and using the FBCF price of $34.90/gallon, representing a high-end 
estimate. Both calculations resulted in a positive NPV. The high-end NPV, $25,661,445, 
was calculated using a discount rate of 0.24 % (current one-year U.S. Treasury Bill 
interest rate), a cash flow of $27,181,795 (the one-year fuel cost savings at $34.90/gal 
[high-end FBCF]), and cash outflow of $1,455,300 (84 * $17,325) representing the cost 
of CCSF application to the 84 tents. CCSF’s NPV, using the standard price of $3.70 per 
gallon, equated to an NPV of $1,419,538 for the CCSF. 
ROI was calculated using the cost of CCSF application to the 84 tents, or 
$1,455,300 (84 * $17,325), as the investment cost of the course of action. The return was 
calculated using the one-year fuel savings from the CCSF application; a low-end estimate of 
$2,881,738 (using the standard price of $3.70/gallon) and a high-end estimate $27,181,795 
(using the FBCF price of $34.90/gallon). Low-end ROI equated to $1,426,438, or a 98% 
ROI. High-end ROI equated to $25,726,495, or a 1,803% ROI in one year. 
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The BEP was calculated by determining the daily savings amount by dividing the 
total annual fuel savings by 365 days. The low-end total one-year savings, equating to 
$2,881,738, yielded a daily savings amount of $7,895 and a BEP of 185 days. The  
high-end total one-year savings, equating to $27,181,795, yielded a daily savings amount 
of $74,471 and a BEP of 20 days. Both BEPs are shorter than the expected duration of 
employment and satisfy the BEP’s objectives. Table 28 shows the one-year fuel savings, 
based on the number of required tents. 
 
















Savings at FBCF 
Price of 
$34.90/gal JP-8 
GP-L 84 9,272 $2,881,738 $12,461,568 $27,181,795 
Table 28.   One-year fuel savings. 
The CCSF’s nonfinancial selection criteria yielded a final score of 6.25. This 
course of action ranked above the status quo in MOPs 1 and 5 only, but resulted in a 
higher final score due to the weightings assigned. This decision matrix valued MOP 1 
(combat effectiveness, with a total weighting of 0.4) and MOP 5 (fuel dependence, with a 
total weight of 0.25) higher than the other MOPs due to the FOB commander’s desired 
end state of “reducing risk to personnel by reducing fuel consumption while maintaining 
combat effectiveness” as stated above. The final, weighted, nonfinancial score of 6.25 
means the course of action satisfied approximately 70% of the desired nonfinancial 
selection criteria’s objectives (6.25 divided by 9, with 9 representing a score that achieves 
all desired objectives). 
The resulting total weighted scores, shown in Tables 29 and 30, depicts that the 
CCSF alternative course of action does a better job in accomplishing the FOB 
commander’s desired end state, based on the chosen selection criteria, ratings, and 
weights, and thus should be chosen as the preferred alternative. 
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MOP-1.1 Quality of Life 
Increased quality 






5 7 0.15 0.60 1.05 
MOP-1.2 Health and Safety 
Reduction in 
health and safety 
costs and risks to 
personnel  







3 8 0.05 0.15 0.40 






1 7 0.25 0.25 1.75 
Combat Effectiveness Total   0.40 1.15 3.5 








Nonfinancial Selection Criteria 





















9 3 0.20 1.80 0.60 
MOP-5 Fuel Dependence 




1 7 0.25 0.25 1.75 
    Total: 4.55 6.25 
Table 29.   Nonfinancial selection criteria COA decision matrix. 
  












1. Financial Selection Criteria 
MOP-1.1 
ROI 
A positive ROI over 
the anticipated period 
of employment (applies 
only to alternative) 
1 8 0.25 0.25 2 
MOP-1.2 
NPV 
A positive NPV over 
the anticipated period 
of employment (applies 
only to alternative) 
1 8 0.25 0.25 2 
MOP-1.3 
BEP 
A BEP shorter than the 
anticipated period of 
employment (applies 
only to alternative) 
1 8 0.50 0.50 4 
Totals       1.00 1.00 8 
Table 30.   Financial selection criteria COA decision matrix. 
I. STEP 8: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This sensitivity analysis addresses two main cost drivers, fuel prices and CCSF 
application prices. Variation in these factors will affect the BEP, NPV, and ROI 
calculations applicable to CCSF’s implementation. NPV and ROI sensitivity analysis 
used only quantifiable costs and benefits. Factoring in nonquantifiable benefits, such as 
generator, fuel truck, and casualty reductions, will increase the value of the ROIs and 
NPVs associated with the respective tent structures. To demonstrate the hypothetical 
effects of casualty reduction from CCSF implementation, the BEP analysis includes the 
savings from casualty reduction based on the mean VSL of $8,100,000 from Step 5. All 
calculations conducted during this analysis are based on the berthing requirements of a 
1,000-person battalion-sized element, equating to 125 frame tents, 125 GP-M tents, or 84 
GP-L tents, respectively, depending on the desired berthing type, to stay consistent with 
the COA decision example in Step 7. 
1. Cost Drivers 
Fuel price and CCSF material and application costs are the two cost drivers 
associated with CCSF implementation. Fluctuations in these cost drivers will alter the 
respective BEPs, ROIs, and NPVs depending on the chosen time frame for analysis.  
  84 
a. Fuel Price (Standard and FBCF) 
Two types of JP-8 fuel prices were varied during the sensitivity analysis, the 
standard price of fuel, based on historical data from fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and 
the FBCF, based on ranges from previous published research. Standard price-per-gallon 
use ranged from $1.60/gal to $5.00/gal, representing an approximate 50% decrease and 
50% increase in price from the historical mean of $3.28/gal (FY2009-FY2105), 
respectively. The price per gal was varied by $0.10 increments to show the marginal 
effects on the financial measures. 
As stated in Chapter III, FBCF depends on the various costs attributed to getting 
the fuel to its final destination and end user. This analysis used an FBCF range of $10.00 
to $100.00 per gallon to show the plausible range of FBCF prices, independent of a 
specific operating environment. A low-end ground FBCF price of $16.00/gal was chosen 
to correspond with the previous examples used during this analysis and may represent 
shorter transportation distances to the end user, a permissive to semipermissive 
environment, and shipment via ground assets. A high-end ground FBCF price of 
$34.90/gal was chosen to again remain consistent with previous examples and account 
for increased transportation distances to the end user, a semi to nonpermissive 
environment, and shipment via ground assets. A high-end, air-transported FBCF price of 
$100.00/gal was chosen to provide a hypothetical cost for fuel transportation to remote 
combat outposts via rotary wing or fixed wing aircraft in semi or nonpermissive combat 
environments. For more accurate FBCF price determination, the specific combat 
environment and transportation details relating to the end user’s location should be 
entered into the FBC Tool (version 4.0), managed by the U.S. Army G-4 LIA. This tool 
requires the user to request access permissions through the LIA. 
b. CCSF Material and Application Cost 
CCSF application costs were varied during the sensitivity analysis to account for 
the variable effects of CCSF materials and contractor services. Cost variation takes into 
account the expected effect of economies of scale resulting from universal 
implementation throughout the DOD and CCSF contract service and application 
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variables, depending on the physical location of CCSF application. It is assessed that 
CCSF application in forward-deployed locations with semi to nonpermissive 
environments will increase the CCSF contract price, translating to a higher price per 
square foot, due to the security and logistic costs associated with delivery. A low-end 
CCSF price of $5.00 per square foot (a ~30% reduction from the median price) was used 
to represent a situation with a permissive or semipermissive environment and minimal 
transportation and contractor costs. A price of $7.00 per square foot was used as the 
median CCSF price per square foot, as it represents the approximate price of the EITS 
contract used in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Djibouti from 2009 through 2010. For a 
high-end estimate, $9.00 per square foot (an ~30% increase from the median price) was 
used to represent the unit cost associated with delivering the end product to more remote, 
forward-deployed locations in a semi to nonpermissive environment, requiring increased 
logistic and security costs. 
2. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on the three financial measures for CCSF 
implementation: the breakeven period, the net present value, and the ROI. The BEP 
analysis is applicable to military planners with defined mission time frames who are 
faced with decisions that require weighing cost savings with the associated risks to 
mission and force. BEP analysis allows an operational commander to determine if CCSF 
application is beneficial to mission accomplishment and if the upfront investment costs 
are recoverable within the anticipated duration of combat operations or employment. 
NPV analysis allows financial planners, military program offices, and budget experts to 
determine the financial viability and net benefits of CCSF implementation. ROI analysis 
is a measure that allows the decision makers to determine the extent of financial benefits 
received from CCSF implementation within a specified or desired time frame. 
a. Break-Even Period 
BEP sensitivity analysis was conducted by varying the standard price per gallon 
of JP-8, while holding constant the CCSF material and application cost of $7.90 per 
square foot. Analysis indicates that a higher standard price per gallon yielded a shorter 
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BEP, as shown in Figure 18. The historical average price of $3.28/gal yielded BEPs of 
226, 232, and 207 days for frame, GP-M, and GP-L, respectively. The low-end price of 
$1.60/gal yielded BEPs of 467, 478, and 426 days. The high-end price of $5.00/gal 
yielded BEPs of 149, 153, and 136 days for frame, GP-M, and GP-L, respectively. The 
average BEP over the entire fuel price range for the respective tents equaled 252, 258, 
and 230 days. 
 
Figure 18.  Standard price per gal vs. break-even period (at $7.90/sq ft CCSF). 
When casualty reduction savings are factored into the analysis, the BEPs for the 
respective tents shortened drastically (Figure 19). The low-end price of $1.60/gal yielded 
BEPs of 17, 17, and 16 days. The high-end price of $5.00/gal yielded BEPs of 16, 16, and 
14 days for frame, GP-M, and GP-L, respectively. The drastically shortened BEPs, when 
added to the casualty savings, are due to the large VSLs in comparison to the small fuel 
price range. 
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Figure 19.  Standard price per gallon vs. break-even period (at $7.90/sq ft CCSF) 
including casualty savings. 
Breakeven period sensitivity analysis was also conducted by varying the fully 
burdened cost of fuel price per gallon of JP-8, while holding the CCSF material and 
application cost of $7.90 per square foot constant. Analysis indicates that when using the 
FBCF price per gallon, breakeven periods were drastically shortened, as shown in  
Figure 20. The low-end ground FBCF estimate of $16.00/gal yielded BEPs of 47, 48, and 
43 days for frame, GP-M, and GP-L, respectively. A high-end FBCF estimate of $34.90 
yielded BEPs of 21, 22, and 19 days for frame, GP-M, and GP-L, respectively. The 
average BEP between the low- and high-end FBCF estimates for the respective tents 
equaled 31, 32, and 28 days. The hypothetical FBCF estimate of $100.00/gal yielded 
drastically short BEPs of 7, 8, and 7 days for frame, GP-M, and GP-L, respectively. 
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Figure 20.  FBCF price per gal vs. break-even period (at $7.90/sq ft CCSF). 
When casualty reduction savings are factored into the FBCF analysis, the BEPs 
for the respective tents ranged from 15 to 5 days (see Figure 21). The low-end price of 
$1.60/gal yielded BEPs of 14, 15, and 13 days. The high-end price of $5.00/gal yielded a 
BEP of 5 days for the frame, GP-M, and GP-L tents. The effect of casualty savings 
yielded BEPs for all structures of approximately two weeks or less. 
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Figure 21.  FBCF price per gal vs. break-even period (at $7.90/sq ft CCSF) including 
casualty savings. 
To account for the other cost driver, CCSF application and material price per 
square foot was varied to show their effect on BEPs, while holding the standard price and 
FBCF constant. The historical average standard price of $3.28/gal, and average of the 
low-end and high-end ground FBCF price of $25.45, was held constant to show CCSF 
cost effects on BEPs. Holding the standard price constant, BEPs equated to 144, 148, and 
132 days for the frame, GP-M, and GP-L tents, respectively at the low-end of $5.00 per 
square foot of CCSF. The high-end CCSF price of $9.00 per square foot yielded BEPs of 
259,266, and 237 days. At the average cost of $7.00 per square foot of CCSF, BEPs 
equated to 202, 207, and 184 days (see Figure 22). 
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Figure 22.  CCSF price per square foot vs. break-even period (at the standard price of 
$3.28/gal). 
Sensitivity analysis was repeated, holding the average FBCF price of $25.45/gal 
constant. BEPs equated to 19, 19, and 17 days for the frame, GP-M, and GP-L tents, 
respectively at the low-end price of $5.00 per square foot of CCSF. The high-end CCSF 
price of $9.00 per square foot yielded BEPs of 33, 34, and 31 days. At the average cost of 
$7.00 per square foot of CCSF, BEPs equated to 26, 27, and 24 days (see Figure 23). 
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Figure 23.  CCSF price per square foot vs. break-even period (at the FBCF price of 
$25.45/gal). 
b. Net Present Value 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on NPV by varying the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB)-published FY2014 discount rates. Discount rates were varied to 
reflect the variations in U.S. Treasury Bill interest rates; rates commonly used when 
quantifying financial benefits of government-funded projects, and expected project 
employment durations. For example, for projects expected to last for five years, the  
five-year U.S. Treasury Bill interest rate should be used as the project’s discount rate to 
determine the financial benefits. To keep the analysis consistent with published 
government guidance, 2014 OMB discount rates of –0.3% (3-year), 0.0% (5-year), and 
1.0% (10-year) were used as published by the Office of Management and Budget 
Circular No. A-94 Revised last updated February 7, 2014. The 2014 Discount Rates for 
OMB Circular No. A-94 does not include a specific, one-year discount rate, so –0.6% was 
used as an estimated value (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2014). 
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To show the effects of changing discount rates, CCSF material and application 
costs and fuel prices were held constant. NPV calculations were conducted using a CCSF 
price per square foot of $7.90, a standard price of fuel of $3.28/gal, and an FBCF price of 
$25.45/gal. NPVs were calculated over 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods to correspond with 
the feasible project durations, as seen in Tables 31 through 34. 
One-Year NPV at a –0.6% Discount Rate 






NPV at Standard 
Price of $3.28 
NPV at FBCF 
Price of 
$25.45/gal 
Frame Tent 125 740,125 $1,513,875 $928,389 $17,436,006 
GP-M 125 742,000 $1,555,375 $893,076 $17,442,512 
GP-L 84 778,848 $1,455,300 $1,114,742 $18,486,030 
Table 31.   One-year NPV of cost savings at a –0.6% discount rate. 
Three-Year NPV at a –0.3% Discount Rate 






NPV at Standard 
Price of $3.28 
NPV at FBCF 
Price of 
$25.45/gal 
Frame Tent 125 740,125 $1,513,875 $5,812,871 $55,335,423 
GP-M 125 742,000 $1,555,375 $5,789,933 $55,437,942 
GP-L 84 778,848 $1,455,300 $6,254,778 $58,368,327 
Table 32.   Three-year NPV of cost savings at a –0.3% discount rate. 
Five-Year NPV at a 0.0% Discount Rate 






NPV at Standard 
Price of $3.28 
NPV at FBCF 
Price of 
$25.45/gal 
Frame Tent 125 740,125 $1,513,875 $12,138,050 $94,180,906 
GP-Medium 125 742,000 $1,555,375 $12,168,800 $94,419,500 
GP-Large 84 778,848 $1,455,300 $12,773,107 $99,108,408 
Table 33.   Five-year NPV of cost savings at a 0.0% discount rate. 
Ten-Year NPV at a 1.0% Discount Rate 






NPV at Standard 
Price of $3.28 
NPV at FBCF 
Price of 
$25.45/gal 
Frame Tent 125 740,125 $1,513,875 $21,478,759 $176,889,334 
GP-M 125 742,000 $1,555,375 $21,495,507 $177,299,793 
GP-L 84 778,848 $1,455,300 $22,740,298 $186,281,883 
Table 34.   Ten-year NPV of cost savings at a 1.0% discount rate. 
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Sensitivity analysis of varying discount rates resulted in positive NPVs for the  
1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year employment durations, indicating that CCSF implementation is 
financially beneficial using the above fuel and CCSF material prices. 
c. Return on Investment 
The sensitivity analysis of the fuel price per gallon (both standard and FBCF), 
versus the one-year ROI, yielded significant results (see Figures 24 and 25). Holding the 
price per square foot of CCSF constant at $7.90, the ROI was only negative over a  
one-year period when the fuel price was below $2.10/gal for frame and GP-M tents, and 
$1.90 for GP-L tents. Large FBCF ROIs are the result of the relatively cheap costs 
associated with CCSF application, compared to the anticipated savings in fuel 
consumption over the one-year period of analysis. If the FBCF is used to price fuel, the 
lowest estimate of $10.00/gal yielded an ROI of 389%, 377%, and 435% over a one-year 
period for frame, GP-M, and GP-L tents, respectively. 
 
Figure 24.  Standard price per gallon vs. return on investment (at $7.90/sq ft CCSF). 
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Figure 25.  FBCF price per gallon vs. return on investment (at $7.90/sq ft CCSF). 
Sensitivity analysis was also conducted to demonstrate the effects of CCSF price 
per square foot variations on ROI. In this analysis, two models were constructed holding 
both the standard price and FBCF price of fuel constant, with the historical average 
standard price of $3.28/gal and the average FBCF price of $25.45/gal. Holding the 
standard price constant, one-year ROIs ranged from 153% to 41% for frame tents, 147% 
to 37% for GP-M tents, and 177% to 54% for GP-L tents. Holding the FBCF price 
constant, one-year ROIs ranged from 1,865% to 992% for frame tents, 1,818% to 965% 
for GP-M tents, and 2,052% to 1,095% for GP-L tents (see Figures 26 and 27). 
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Figure 26.  CCSF price per sq ft vs. return on investment (at the standard price of 
$3.28/gal). 
 
Figure 27.  CCSF price per sq ft vs. return on investment (at the FBCF price of 
$25.45/gal). 
  96 
J. STEP 9: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conclusion 
Recent DOD efforts aimed at reducing energy consumption and increasing 
weapon platform fuel efficiencies have been focused towards lowering fuel costs, while 
moving away from fossil-based fuels. Fuel price volatility has added substantial 
unexpected operating costs to DOD budgets, forcing department-wide efforts to provide 
viable solutions to reduce fossil fuel consumption. One readily available solution is the 
implementation of insulating technologies for structures in forward-deployed locations to 
reduce the fuel burden of combat operations. 
This cost benefit analysis found that CCSF implementation is capable of 
providing a drastic reduction in forward-deployed operational energy demand and 
significant fuel cost savings. Financial analysis indicated CCSF’s ability to return the 
upfront investment costs early, and within historical employment durations, despite 
variations in the cost drivers. Based on projected annual fuel savings analyzed during this 
CBA, universal CCSF implementation may yield exponential cost savings when 
conducting forward-deployed military operations. Besides the measureable financial 
benefits, CCSF implementation provides numerous nonquantifiable benefits to mission 
and personnel that may increase combat effectiveness and endurance, while lowering 
overall risk. 
CCSF’s proven combat effectiveness in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Djibouti 
make it a viable option for easy implementation into existing DOD forward-deployed 
practices. The previous deployed application of CCSF insulation can be used as a 
baseline on which future employment can be structured. CCSF’s success on the 
battlefield warrants continued efforts to explore its use in future combat operations and 
implementation into similar energy reduction projects. 
2. Recommendations 
There are three recommendations that will benefit both the DOD and federal 
government with regard to future use of CCSF for forward-deployed, semipermanent 
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structures. These recommendations may require some further analysis to ensure plausible 
and effective implementation into current DOD systems and policies. 
• The DOD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation should conduct further 
tests to assess CCSF’s viability for future use on deployed structures. This 
testing will provide the DOD with documented and projected costs and 
benefits associated with future use. 
• The DOD should implement CCSF on existing expeditionary structures in 
forward-deployed locations with enduring footprints to begin capturing 
savings from fuel reduction, while CCSF implementation assessments  
are considered. 
• The USD (AT&L) should explore CCSF contract support options for current 
and future deployment operations. Contract exploration will provide data for 
analysis in regard to best practices for future CCSF sourcing and contracts. 
Consideration of the recommendations above will be critical to decisions 
regarding the future use of CCSF insulation for sustained combat operations. 
3. Areas of Further Research 
There are several potential areas of further research for CCSF application and 
associated benefits. These pertain to all military service branches that conduct 
expeditionary military operations in areas that require robust logistic infrastructures and 
fuel resources. 
• CCSF performance on other commonly used expeditionary structures beyond 
those considered during this CBA. 
• Research, analysis, and identification of relevant costs associated with 
creating an organic military capability to provide both CCSF materials and 
services for ready employment and deployment. 
• CCSF’s integration with energy efficient generators, power grids, or 
alternative energy sources currently undergoing military research and 
development efforts. 
• Further research regarding CCSF ballistic protection capabilities and 
alternative uses. 
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